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A novel approach for securing data against adversary attacks in UAV embedded HetNet using identity based authentication scheme

A novel approach for securing data against adversary attacks in UAV embedded HetNet using... INTRODUCTIONFor facilitating Internet of Things (IoT) utilities with varying quality of service (QoS) specifications in distinct realistic cases (viz metropolitan, remote, and densely congested zones), it is vital to harness the significant benefits of each networking structure [1]. For illustration, sparsely dispatched terrestrial networks in metropolitan regions could offer high maximum throughput access, UAV‐assisted wireless networking systems could provide extensive coverage and effortless networking to even the most remote and sparse dense areas. UAV communications can also endorse established cellular communications for fast service growth and serve value‐effective offloading of the overly crowded regions [2]. Nowadays, the current infrastructure cannot wholly accommodate individually the need to process massive amounts of information and incorporate large‐scale applications like big data, Internet of Things, cloud computing etc.From an air‐based network, due to swap limitations, a broad range of unpiloted flying devices, which include UAVs, spaceships or balloons, can be confined to distinct operational elevations. In overall, a UAV is configured with transceivers to have a community of ground clients with adaptable access to the internet, and an unmanned aircraft room is the accompanying broadcasting region. The scale of the unmanned aircraft enclosure is governed with the elevation, proximity, transmission power, and environmental conditions of the UAV. Besides, the UAV swarm is linked by preserving UAV‐to‐UAV connections in order to excess facilities mutually beneficial. The multi‐tiered unmanned aircraft platform not only serves regulating signals swapping between UAVs in order to eliminate obstacles and measure flying trajectories, and also provides information for mobile device access. Unique pilotless vehicles are trained with diverse network frameworks like LTE (Long Term Evolution) or Wifi communicate with infrastructure and services or satellites that define access points between multilevel UAV networks and other structures. The UAV may use a sky‐haul link to the satellites or link via a backhaul connection to the surface network [3]. Also, for last decades the usage of unmanned vehicles improved to the large extent in most of daily applications. The applications mostly include unpredictable occurrences which could not be stopped, namely, Calamities, country defence, quest, rescue and, mainly, military surveillance [4]. Figure 1 presents UAV embedded HetNet description.1FIGUREStructure of UAV embedded HetNetA HetNet network composes of picocells, small cells and macro cells, femtocells that help portable users including cell phones, IoT applications, self‐driving cars, and many others shown in Figure 3, generating an inexorably intertwined structure of emerging technologies for 5G wireless devices. This encompasses all interesting wireless 5G small cells technologies, such as mm‐wave range of frequencies, energy harnessing, NOMA (non‐orthogonal multiple access) transmission, and D2D (device to device) connectivity, and has recently become an essential research topic. Moreover, the continually rising computational capacity of mobile equipment could be programmed for mobile edge computing (MEC), in which unmanned aircrafts could program computational jobs while onboard computer systems conduct such assignments. And together with this, famous details can be stored on UAVs or ground devices and distributed around end equipment's through drone cells or D2D connectivity.Not only does the UAV optimized HetNets surmount the extra demand power of users. Besides it also reduces latency and delay by using appropriate network optimization algorithms thereby increasing the user's performance significantly. With these enormous capabilities, the UAV strengthened consumer trust in its use in critical situations such as natural disasters as well as in the compilation of identification data from combat zones etc. However, the data collected for tracking specific scenarios with the assistance of this network should be secure from adverse threats. It is because the attackers can target data confidentiality, integrity, interception and protection, which can lead to unauthorized interception and indeed make room as an authorized entity. In order to overcome these problems, a robust authentication system exists that makes it difficult for intruders to breach network privacy. Therefore, security system would rely on identity‐based standards that must be validated by all authorized users in the network before sensitive communication. Therefore, both the server and UAVs will provide data protection for the network nodes. Therefore, UAV integrated HetNets will become a reliable network in terms of privacy and security. So, this increases the usage of UAV‐assisted HetNets in many applications like serving civilian, natural disasters, and particularly in defence jobs.BackgroundWith the accomplishment of present wireless connectivity has indeed provoked an increase in the amount of mobile internet traffic for impending 5G wireless networks and above 5G (B5G). The worldwide mobile traffic would achieve 1 zettabyte/mo by 2028, as per the latest report [5]. It will result in the existing infrastructure dealing with high needs for potential as well as setting a significant strain on mobile operators in terms of higher capital expenditures and operating expenses. In order to satisfy all such expanding requests, several initial attempts were devoted to HetNets (heterogeneous networks) (i.e. deploying different tiny cells) [6].Furthermore, in unforeseen or extreme situations (like battlefields and rehabilitation of delivery), the installation of earth‐based infrastructure seems to be economically unfeasible and difficult due to increased capital expenditures and complex and turbulent atmospheres. In exchange to tackle this problem, intelligent heterogeneous structure by harnessing unmanned aircraft (aerial vehicles) [7] has been deemed the valuable advanced standard for promoting some fundamental consumption framework of upcoming wireless devices, like massive machine‐top communications (MTC), enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) with bandwidth‐consuming and extremely‐reliable low‐latency communication (URLLC). Unmanned aircraft could take part in a pivotal task in offering catastrophe‐stricken geographic area network service healing, strengthening public security infrastructures, or coping with other emergencies when URLLC is needed. UAV‐helped HetNets in specific can be considered a key counterbalance to 5 G cellular networks [8]. UAVs are thus recognized as a valuable part of wireless 5G/B5G innovations.UAVs are used as airborne information sharing devices (namely, gliding ground stations or portable circuits) by escalating transceivers to have and improve high traffic demand surface‐to‐surface facilities as well as crowded situations, usually specified as UAV‐assisted networks [9–13]. Whereas UAVs are used as airborne endpoints to inspire the wide range of options from freight to surveillance, commonly known as infrastructure‐based UAVs [14, 15]. Besides, much of the ongoing work is confined to UAVs in support of cellular connectivity. UAVs have been fitted with electronic tools or engaged detectors in most current circumstances that can enable various applications such as post‐disaster evacuation, low altitude surveillance, connectivity assistance deployment and logistics. In addition, to endorse wireless internet connectivity in a massive particular region, a wasp of unmanned aircrafts establishing flying ad hoc networks (FANETs) [16, 17] and interacting with surface endpoints.Research objective, motivation and contributionThe main aim of this research work is to provide the trustiness of the users exchanging the information over the given network in terms of safety and privacy. Security and privacy are important considerations in UAV supported HetNets because of vulnerable exploits within it. The interaction in HetNets supported by UAV is often performed by wireless media, which is susceptible to eavesdropping and person in the centre assault. In fact, the complexity of the heterogeneity‐related tools, applications, and network environments demands more complicated protection control. From the other side, UAV integrated HetNets are designed on constrained‐tools, which are resource‐limited, for example, energy and processing abilities, so it will not be viable to incorporate complicated security solution in such a network, for example, it must be “lightweight” and effective. Concisely, it is essential to develop a protection structure for a defined infrastructure that would be resource intensive and at the same time successful in managing security management problems. So, the given network UAV‐integrated HetNets are provided with one of the computationally lightweight security algorithm known as identity based authentication algorithm. The characteristics of computationally lightweight is because of not involvement of PKI (central authority). And hence the network entities have to just authenticate, sign, and transact encrypted information among them. In this way the network security rises up to the satisfactory level of interest for the authorized users in the given network.Scope of this research workThe main focus of this research work is to implement the identity‐based authentication scheme in UAV‐aided HetNets and securing communication against vulnerable threats of intruders. However, the issues related to the UAV in terms of energy constraints, storage and other technical faults have not been focused in such research article. Hence, this work is purely needed to achieve the security and privacy in military based missions that play crucial role in defence of the countries.The rest of this paper focusses on the topics: Section 2 discusses the existing literature review which has been carried out in the related work and introduces the research gap. Section 3 presents the concept of system model. Also, Section 4 provides the description of identity based cryptography. Section 5 explains the proposed technique that has been carried out in UAV‐assisted HetNet in two phases—first phases between USER and BASE STATION, second phase between USER and UAV in presence of BASE STATION. Section 6 gives a brief description regarding the AVISPA tool and the validation with simulation of the two‐phase proposed mechanism has been performed in Section 6.1. Section 7 presents the discussion of the work carried out in this paper. Section 8 provides the conclusion of this research work and its future scope.RELATED WORKThe most important issue that has to be kept under consideration is their security measures. This section presents the relevant study that was explored in area of security of networks. In the current‐state of‐the‐art, the authors presented the serious design‐based threats that the UAVs face because they have been developed without any wireless security protocol and encryption scheme [37]. In another research work [50], the authors analysed the existing threats and vulnerabilities facing by UAVs like spoofing (GPS spoofing) [38, 39], malware infection [40, 41], data interference and interception [42–44], manipulation [45], natural issues [46, 47] and Wi‐Fi jamming [2, 15]. The authors of the paper implemented the rule‐based intrusion detection security scheme [48] in the UAV based network that suffer from several security attacks and challenges. The implemented scheme helps in detecting the false data injection attacks, especially those targeting the signal strength. They proved that the intruders could be traced within 40 s. However, this scheme suffers from the complexity management, which needs human involvement for protocol configuration. Also, this system was incapable in tracing the unknown intruder attacks. The research paper [49] worked out by the authors discussed the serious malicious vulnerabilities and attacks of Internet of Drones (IoD) system. The authors presented different cryptographic approaches and techniques against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spoofing, integrity threats, and privacy. However, the suggested approach has not been validated and simulated with any proper available security tool.Also because of presence of open links and dynamic topologies the embedded network has to face vulnerable attacks that can blank out mission‐critical zones by intentional jamming/disruption. The privacy and security is essential in UAV‐assisted networks as the UAVs are always unattended, by which the intruder can easily attack or capture them. In order to prevent these malicious and vulnerable modifications such as Denial of Services (DoS), man‐in‐the‐middle attack, message integrity etc. there is essence of lightweight and secure security system to avoid these attacks. So in cellular based UAV implementations, the Artificial Intelligence solutions were proposed addressing the security issues [51], However, a zero‐sum network ban game was espoused to acquire cyber‐physical potential threats in UAV delivery systems. [52]. In the wide geographical environment of interconnected space‐air‐ground networks, SDN (Software Defined Networks) controllers are accountable for handling resources and monitoring network activity, there is an immediate need to secure SDN controllers from multiple cyber‐attacks where attackers will wiretap the data and control signals sent via the UAV systems' radio links. Cyber‐attacks on UAV networks have been recorded in [53] and cyber‐security remains a big obstacle to be addressed in the actual use of UAVs. Hence it is necessary to design timely tactics and counter‐mechanisms to counter malicious cyber‐attacks.The paper's authors [54] centred on the assaults against small UAVs by recognizing fraudulent behaviours over their sensors. Sensors are designed in the proposed framework that detects cyber‐physical attacks, based on knowledge of the physical system and techniques of statistical analysis. However, the proposed scheme could not detect a combination of piece‐wise constant attacks of lesser magnitude. This research work [55] also suggested a specification‐based identification strategy to protect against cyber‐attacks in a UAV system. This study used a behaviour rule‐based UAV‐IDS (intrusion detection system) in which behaviour rules are designed based on defined models of attack, taking into account careless, unpredictable, and opportunistic attacks. This research eliminated detection errors (i.e. false positives and false negatives) based on the critical tradeoff between security and performance of UAVs.Along with the above work done in the literature review, Table 1 illustrates the comparative study of the existing schemes in the state‐of‐the‐art. Table 1 has been categorized into two various subsections. Section 1 focuses those works where identity based authentication security scheme has been implemented. And Section 2 provides the detailed comparison of various other security‐related existing works in the domain.1TABLEComparative study of the existing scheme in the state‐of‐the‐artSection 1—IB security scheme based reported workRef.Application zoneIssuesSecurity SchemeSimulation platformRemarks[56]Cloud computingAuthentication of users and services is a significant issue for trust and security of cloud computing.Identity‐based hierarchical model for cloud computing (IBHMCC)GridSim based on JavaLight weight and efficient than existing security systems.Especially more light weight user side.Section 2—Detailed comparison in other security related existing domainsRef.UAV usedHetNet usedType of networkType of attackRouting protocolSecurity approach/mechanismSimulation platformRemarks[18] [2018]YesNoNetworked UAVsCoagulation attackNilEncoding scheme has been used to improve the security of the physical layerMATLABIntroduces new attack known as coagulation attack.PDR diminishes dramatically during this assault and exceeds the cut‐off value beyond which the network is unworkable.iii. This attack also increases network latency beyond the threshold.[19] [2017]YesNoUAV NetworkGPS Spoofing attackWiFi attackNilJamming‐to‐noise sensing defence and multi‐antenna defence for GPS spoofingEnabling WPA2 and disabling SSID for WiFi attacksEttus USRP and GNU radioBuilt a track‐modify‐and‐replay program with affordable GPS.[20] [2018]YesNoCyber‐physical systems (CPS)Wireless attacksNilIdentity‐based encryption, along with selective data encryptionOMNET++Offers consistency in network by empowering nodes to act as cluster heads.[21] [2016]YesNoUAV networkCyber attacksDTNSystem of risk estimation based on beliefNs‐3Suggested an IDS‐based cyber‐detection system[22] [2018]YesNoNetworked UAVsMalicious attacksNilIDS approachesNilSurveys the key state‐of‐the‐art UAV‐IDS approaches.Examine problems of building a cyber‐physical UAV‐IDS network.[23] [2012]YesNoUnmanned aircraft system (UAS), CPSAttacks on integrity and privacy of CPSNilSpecification based IDSMonte‐Carlo simulation testUses lightweight specification based behaviour rules.The detection rate of UAS node can reach 100% for detecting attackers.[24] [2017]YesNoCommercial UAVsCyber‐attacks, hijacking problemNilSecure communication protocol for multi‐UAV and ground stationRaspberry PiUses online NTP server pool for NTP server.Uses lithium battery & MOSFET to disable UAV.[25] [2019]YesNo5G communication networkNilNilNilNilSurvey on UAV communication in 5G network is presented.[26] [2016]YesNoProfessional UAV networksMan‐in‐the‐middle attackNilXBee 868LP on‐board encryptionCommitted hardware encryptionApplication layer encryptionHardware design with telemetry, manual remote control, WiFi 802.11 and XBee 868LP chipsDiscusses security issues of professional UAVs.Performs a man‐in‐the‐middle attack and gives countermeasure.[27] [2018]NoNoNilIllegal copying of multimedia dataNilNon‐chaotic image encryption method using cyclic group and permutation techniques.For validation, 12 eight‐bit grayscale images have been taken as plain images of size 512×512The proposed scheme has two phases‐ confusion and diffusion phase.The proposed scheme is robust against several attacks.The vulnerability of the proposed scheme has not been studied.[28] [2015]NoNoPublic networksAdversary attacksNilEnhanced smart‐card based authenticated key agreement schemeAVISPAReview Jiang et al.’s scheme.Due to the limitations of the above scheme, the proposed scheme is given.Provides user anonymity.[29] [2017]NoNoOrganizational networksInsider attacksNilSituational crime theory and social bond theoryStructural equation modellingResults show that engagement in information security successfully decreases insider attacks.[30] [2018]NoNoInternet of ThingsNilNilIoT frameworks are consideredNilSurvey of security of 8 IoT frameworks has been done.PDR—Packet Delivery Ratio, DoS—Denial of Service, USRP—Universal Software Radio Peripheral, GPS—Global Positioning System, SSID—Service Set Identifier, IDS—Intrusion Detection System, DTN—Disruption‐Tolerant Networks, IP—Internet Protocol, PSC—Public Safety Communication, CRE—Cell Range Expansion, CPS—Cyber Physical System.SYSTEM MODELThe model that the authors take in this research article for implementing the identity‐based authentication (security) in military based missions is UAV‐assisted HetNet. Actually, the communication in the network between user and main base station can occur in two ways. First, directly through the channels created by small cells (pico, femto) available within the network. Second in presence of UAVs links created UAVs relay nodes present in the network. Therefore it becomes neccessary to secure links/channels in both cases for secure communication.Before going into the depth of this research work. It is important to keep certain important parameters under view regarding the taken system model shown in Table 2. This will help the readers about the technical parameters which have been taken into consideration on implementing the system model.2TABLESystem modelParametersSystemIllustrationNetwork securityIdentity based (IB)Contrasting from other security approaches. The identity based is computationally lightweight security Algorithm that improves confidentiality of data and the authenticity of the users within the network.Facilities allow by UAVsFunctions as relay nodes (UAVs)Relay nodes (UAVs) establishes the links between user and base station in information exchange that are out of line of sight.Working band for relay nodes (UAVs)L‐band and C‐bandFor establishing the secure links in communication. The UAVs working efficiently in L frequency band and C frequency band respectively.UAV mobility modelRandom waypoint modelBecause of its simplicity and efficiency. This model suits best for the relay nodes during communication.Place of UAVs (Altitude)Low altitude platform (LAP)The heights at which the UAVs are placed above the earth is in the range of 200–700 m.Modulation approachOrthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)The connectivity between user, UAV and base station would have OFDM modulation approach.IDENTITY‐BASED CRYPTOGRAPHYIn 1984 Shamir launched this concept earlier. Afterwards Boneh and Franklin effectively implemented a fully functional IBE scheme [31]. Identity‐based cryptosystem raises the issue of either third party authorization requirements or certificate authority. Alternatively, IBE scheme provides intelligible public key encryption licenses which are acquired from separate credentials to retrieve public keys. The public key of identity‐based system is an arbitrary sequence from any register, including name, date of birth, telephone number, fingerprint, Aadhaar code, and other special assets. Anyone who has a wide public with a secret typing scheme (Cryptographic Master Key) for private key calculation will then test the public key in identity‐based scheme [32]. This is all feasible only with the help of a secure registry that ensures such protection.In principle, identity‐based cryptographic security scheme focuses on using pairing or bilinear mapping. In the above deduction the two classes are mapped jointly.Let us suppose G and GT are a multiplicative cyclic group that includes all the large q prime order.Then we define mapping ê. G* G →GT, ê (u, v) ε GT, where u, v ε G.If the following properties are satisfied, this is known as bilinear mapping.(1)Bilinearity property: ê (ua, vb) = [ê (u, v)]ab, where u, v ε G, and a, b ε Zp.(2)Non‐ degeneracy property: if g is the generator of GT then ê (g, g) ≠ 1 (identity element in GT).(3)Computability: ê (u, v) should be efficiently computable where (u, v) ε G*G.In IBE implementation two types of pairing are available, namely, Weil Pairing and Tate Pairing. When implemented for computing restricted devices [33], Tate Pairing was calculated to be more effective than Weil Pairing.Algorithm IBE cryptographyIdentity Based system given by Boneh Franklin's consists of four randomized algorithms namely Encrypt, Setup, Decrypt an Extract as shown in Figure 2.SetupHere we take < p, G, GT, g, ê >.Define public parameter param = < p, g, Q, H1, H2 >.H1: {0, 1}*→ G, this will convert the user “Id” to the element in G of any arbitrary length.H2: GT→ {0, 1)l, means fixed length l.Generation of secret key for user.Encryption: Here we have public param = <p, g, Q = gα, H1, H2), Idi ε {0, 1}* and message m ε {0, 1}l. This will generate the cipher text CT = (C1, C2) where C1 = gr (r → Zp), C2 = m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), Q)r). This is called an encryption that takes place from sender to receiver.Decryption: This is the process that takes place at the receiver end and is reverse process of encryption.Here, m = C2 xor H2 (ê (SKId, C1)m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), Q)r) xor H2 (ê (H1(Id)α, gr))m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), g)rα xor H2 (ê (H1(Id), g)rα = m (message).2FIGUREThe algorithm of IBEPROPOSED TECHNIQUEThe trustworthiness of the base station and small cells platform is motivated and encouraged by the calculated platform above base functions [34]. So, in the proposed technique of identity‐based security scheme of this network, the base station and small cells will be the trustworthy and reliable server for authorized users and UAVs. Also, the creation of trusted entities needs to be a safe and managed directly by the network owner. This in turn will help a non‐feasible based PKC (Public Key Cryptography) network to provide a healthier environment for monitoring and control the entire network. Moreover, in proposed identity‐based scheme no communication is required with the base server during authentication process. As just the receiver Id is valuable for the transmitter to encrypt the limited data. Hence, identity‐based security implementations use less memory to store the public keys of authorized users so that network becomes economically sound in terms of power consumptions. Thus, the scheme would guarantee secure communication with clients through an authentication process between UAV and base station respectively. Awareness of intruders throughout authentication process was taken into consideration. In many ways the attacker may target the channel of communication such as eavesdrop, hijack, alter, and impregnate some data. Those above equations are built into the “HLPSL” language and tested with the “AVISPA TOOL”.The base station and user authenticationIn this section the authentication process is discussed between the base station (S) and User (U). Upon building up the network, it is necessary for base stations to have their Nu′.hm_U${N}_u^{\prime}.{\rm{ hm\_U}}$ (for authentication) value and user Ids. Furthermore, it is necessary for users to have public keys and specific common parameters. Figure 3 demonstrates UAV‐integrated HetNet IBE prototype. For this case, the prototype written in HLPSL.3FIGUREThe user (U) and station (S) authenticationOn initiating the authentication process, first the user (U) send a request involving the identity based credentials (Nu′.hm_U′${N}_u^{\prime}.{\rm{ hm\_U}}^{\prime}$) to the base station (S) by using the public key of base station (Ks). The base station (S) accepts the request from user (U) and start to compare it with the credentials stored in the trustlist of base station (main server). If the match occurs between the recipient's credentials and the stored credentials, then the authentication would continue to process masquerading otherwise the process will abort. In process of authentication, the user has also to know is the base station authenticated one or one. For that the base station would send its own authenticating credential (Nv) with the credential of the user by using the public key of given user (Ku) that is S→U:SND({Nu′.Nv′}_Ku)${\rm{S}} \to {\rm{U}}:{\rm{\ SND}}( {\{ {{{\rm{N}}}_u^{\prime}.{{\rm{N}}}_v^{\prime}} \}\_{{\rm{K}}}_u} )$ which means base station (S) requests user (U) to authenticate as well. Once the user and base station will get agreed that both are authorized entities of the network and also satisfied that the channel is secure. Then the information exchange will start between them.1U→S:SNDNu′.hm_−U_−Ks$$\begin{equation}U \to S:SND\ {\left\{ {N_u^{\rm{{\prime}}}.\ {h}_m\_ - U} \right\}}\_ - {K}_s\end{equation}$$User (U) requests base station (S) to verify on hm value.2S:RcvU.S.Nu′.hm_−U_−KsinU.hm_−U,trustlist$$\begin{equation}S:Rcv \left( {U.S.{{\left\{ {N_u^{\prime}.\ {h}_m\_ - \ U} \right\}}}\_ - {K}_s} \right)in \left( {U.\ {h}_m\_ - \ U,\ trustlist} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) compares the recipient's hm_−U${h}_m\_ - \ U$ with the value in the trustlist.3S→U:SNDNu′.Nv′−Ku$$\begin{equation}S \to U:SND\left( {{{\left\{ {N_u^{\prime}.\ N_v^{\prime}} \right\}}}_ - \ {K}_u} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) requests user (U) to authenticate on Nv value.4U:RcvNu′.Nv′−Ku$$\begin{equation}U:Rcv \left( {{{\left\{ {N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}.\ N_v^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}}_ - \ {K}_u} \right)\end{equation}$$5U→S:SNDNv′−Ks$$\begin{equation}U \to S:SND{\left( {\left\{ {N_v^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}} \right)}_ - {K}_s\end{equation}$$User (U) requests base station (S) to authenticate Hm value.In this way the server (S) authenticate on hm_U value only when the Nu and Nv are authenticated successfully. This registered or we can say authenticated syntax is free of serious attacks. The base station can establish new list that contains the identification of trustworthy users due to successful authenticity of syntax. Thus, the newly established list is smaller (in terms of size) than the previous one (trust list) that is promoted amongst the registered users or can be placed on the server for more quick registration process. The users will transfer information which exists in newly established list with those of users who have ID. Within this web or chain the authorized users are honoured as long as they remain active or on ON mode. If failure happens for any reason, users have to re‐authenticate with the base station. If failure of re‐substantiation takes places it would delete the ID of the user from the trusted registry. Hence the consumers have to go for similar criteria to become part of web with fresh substantiation again.Authentication process between USER and UAV in presence of base stationIn this process, the users are verified by the UAV either by itself or with the help of station's assistance. Information contained by the user packet includes its ID (Idu, nonce number, and encrypted message (coded with general key)) and the address of the transmitter and receiver respectively. This helps the UAV to check the Idu with the Id available in the trust list saved in its internal memory or on the main server. If it happens, the server must identify the UAV, and the connection begins. The nonce plays a vital role in avoiding repeated attacks by invaders within the network. For this case, Figure 4 shows the authentication process. To be clear, symbols are listed in Table 3 for subsequent use.4FIGUREUser (U) and UAV via station (S) authentication3TABLESymbols used in this entire paperSymbolsDescriptionPPrime numberÊBilinear mappingΑSecret keyIdiUser identityLFixed length of bits*Arbitrary length of bitsSKiSecret key corresponding to receiver.GgeneratorH1, H2Hash functionsKGCKey generation centreZpPrime order mapMMessageCCipher textHm_UNew trust valueNu′${{\rm{N}}}_u^{\prime}$Nv′${{\rm{N}}}_v^{\prime}$Nonce random numbersKU, KSUser and station public keysSNDSend packet_KSEncrypted packet with KS public keyIdUUser node's identifierPvKUUser's private key.A.SSender ID. Receiver IDFirst technique: The authentication between user and UAV is going through main base station as the trust list is stored here. In this case the information exchange is started when the user (U) send data to UAV (D) with its own identity (Id U) by using the UAV's public key (Kd). Before giving back response to user's request for information exchange. There is need to authenticate user's identity first. Whether it is valid or not. For it the UAV would take help of main server (S) where the user's authenticity list is stored. So the UAV forwards the recipient's information to the base station (S) for checking its real identity. The base station is checking its identity by mapping the recipient's credentials with that of the stored ones in the trusted list. If the match occurs, the process would succeed otherwise aborted. So on matching the identity, the base station send an acknowledgment to the UAV and the UAV starts to communicate with the given user. This will get more cleared by the following Protocol models written in the High Level Protocol Specification Language or HLPSL6U:SND(U.D.IdUdata.Nu′−Kd$$\begin{equation}U:SND\ (U.D.IdU\ {\left\{ {data.\ N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}_{ - \ }{K}_d\end{equation}$$User (U) sends data with user identity (IdU) to UAV (D).7D:Rcv(U.D.IdUdata.Nu′−Kd$$\begin{equation}D:Rcv\ (U.D.\ IdU\ {\left\{ {data.N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}_ - \ {K}_d\end{equation}$$UAV (D) receives the data with its identity (IdU) from user (U).8SNDD.S.IdU$$\begin{equation}SND \left( {D.S.IdU} \right)\end{equation}$$Here the user's identity (IdU) received by UAV (D) is forwarded to base station (S) for an authentication.9S:RcvSNDD.S.U.IdU⋮⋱inU.IdU,trustlist=|>$$\begin{equation}S:Rcv\left( {SND \left( {D.S.U.IdU} \right)\vdots \ddots in \left( {U.IdU, trustlist} \right)} \right) = \ | &gt; \end{equation}$$Here the base station (S) receives the user's information from UAV (D) and mapped with the stored values of trustlist.10SNDS.D.OK$$\begin{equation}SND \left( {S.D.OK} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) sends an acknowledgement signal to UAV (D).11D:RcvS.D.OK=|>SNDD.U.OK$$\begin{equation}D:Rcv\left( {S.D.OK} \right) = \ | &gt; SND \left( {D.U.OK} \right)\end{equation}$$UAV (D) receives the acknowledgement signal and authenticate the user.U: proceed with the next packet.Second technique: In this technique there is no involvement of main base station for user authentication instead the authentication is done by UAV itself. Rest of the process is same above but the benefit of this way is that, it is consuming less overhead communication than the first one. No doubt both techniques ensure improvement in data confidentiality and privacy in presence of intruder attacks.AVISPA TOOLAVISPA also known as push‐button tool has emerged to authenticate protocols and implementations of huge‐scale network security. The protocols are transposed into a language called as HLPSL (specification language for the High‐Level Protocol). Basic structure under the HLPSL signifies numerous respondents as well as role compositions. There is autonomy among the tasks, obtaining several initial information through variables, interacting with extra tasks by channels [35]. The output format of AVISPA Tool Figure () is generated using either Cl‐Atse (constraint logic‐based attack searcher), OFMC (on‐the‐fly model‐checker), SATMC (SAT‐based model‐checker), and TA4SP (Tree Automated based on Automatic Security Protocol Analysis Approximations) [36]. The flow chart of AVISPA is shown in Figure 5.5FIGUREFlow chart of AVISPA ToolThroughout this scenario, it is assumed that the security protocols presented by HLPSL are simulated in presence of intrusion assaults. It means the intruder has a full control over the given network. And there are number of ways shown below.The intruder can start any number of parallel protocol sessions.The intruder knows all the public data of the protocol.The intruder has all the privileges / keys of corrupted agents.The intruder can read, store, block every sent message.The intruder can build and send messages.The intruder can encrypt or decrypt if he has/she the key.In nutshell, the intruder has power to target confidentiality of information, the integrity of messages, and also can act as interceptors between many authorized users, and as an authorized individual (Dolev‐Yao model). Under ATMC and OFMC back‐end options, the simulation output or execution of this security protocol provides the “SUMMARY” whether the protocol is SAFE or UNSAFE or whether the analysis is incomplete.Validation of proposed protocolsThe proposed protocols discussed above for the privacy of the UAV‐assisted HetNets need to be validating to check their authenticity and satisfaction for the users. Whether these protocols can be trusted or not for the information exchange through this network. The AVISPA Tool available as open‐source software helps to validate formally these proposed protocols. The formal validation done in two cases.Between user and base stationBetween user and UAV with the help of base stationFormal validation of proposed protocol between user (U) and base station (BS)In this section, the implemented proposed protocols are validated in AVISPA Tool between user and base station. The validation is expressed in terms of roles that are formulated using HLPSL. The roles in AVISPA Tool are session, goal, and environment. These roles are dependent on each other. Hence the validation of first role will proceed to the next one and so on. The roles played by agents in the proposed protocol are designed with proper symbols shown in the given figures. For example, for this case the symbol for user (agent) is U and for the base Station (agent) is BS. On the validation of this role the BS knows the authentication of the User (U) from its specific credentials or attributes as well as authenticates itself to the User (U). From Figure 6, it is clear that the User (U) send its identity with Secret (s) encrypted in a public key of BS (Ks) that is U → BS: (BS. U. Nv. s) _Ks. The BS here knows itself, the user (U) and the SND and RCV channels (dy). At starting the BS (agent) does not know the secret (S). So, the local variable which is any natural number or nonce number (nat) is taken into account and is initialized to “0” that is state: = 0. After that the BS receives the message, the identity of User (U) and a text S’ which does not know by BS. For the transition to occur you need to start from state = 0 to RCV (start). The “start” is the specific message that is sent by Avispa Tool to start the protocol. When it is true, it goes to a different state that is from State: = 0 to State: = 1. On transition, the BS acknowledges to U with its own identity by using the public key of U (Ku) and assures itself to U about the satisfaction of real identity (SND ({BS.U.Nv’}_Ku). Once the U gets assurance from the BS. There occurs a transition from State = 1 to State = 2 and BS starts to trust and allows the User (U) for the information exchange.6FIGURERole specification of base station (BS) in HLPSL of proposed protocolFigure 7 explains the role played by User (U). The role is started with a local variable called “state” which is assigned with a random number or nonce number that is (state: nat) and text which is actually credential of User (Nv). At starting that state is intialized with a “0”. After that the transition occurs from State = 0 to State = 1 . If the received information from user is matched with the credentials stored in the trust list of the BS. It mean here the User (U) authenticates itself to BS by involving its own specific attribute under HLPSL label witness (U,BS,auth_1,Nv’)7FIGURERole specification of user (U) in HLPSL of proposed protocolFigure 8 explains the composition of session role that are going in parallel with each other. It means the roles played by both base station (BS) and the user (U) are going side by side for authentication and result in a secure information exchange. Also, there is an environment section where we define the constants in HLPSL that are used for the validation of the proposed protocols. The intruder knowledge is also taken into account in this section. And it defines on what parameters the intruder has control over the network. For example, for this protocol the intruder has control over station, user and public key. This Figure () also defines the goal of our proposed protocol validation. Here the aim is to show that the secret S between BS and U is secure or unsecure. It means the protocol validation is authenticated between Station and user even intruder have full control over the network.8FIGURERole specification of session, environment and goal in HLPSLFigure 9 presents the summary of the validation of proposed protocols and shows whether the implemented protocol is safe or unsafe under the knowledge of intruder. It is clear from the Figure () that the validation of this protocol is safe when it is executed by verification tool CL‐AtSe in AVISPA Tool. Hence the proposed protocol is authenticated and can be used as security for secure exchange of information between user (U) and base station (BS).9FIGURESummary specification in HLPSLPictorial view of protocol validation between Base Station (BS) and User (U)In AVISPA Tool, there are also options available for the simulation outputs. There are two tools available for the simulation outputs in AVISPA Tool.Protocol Simulation ToolIntruder Simulation ToolProtocol simulationThe protocol simulation tool provides the animated or graphical specification as shown in Figure 10. Here you can see to build a message sketch chart between user playing the role as U and the base station playing the role as BS. When you trigger the option, it is clear from the chart and shows a message (secret) between U and BS protected with credentials and keys present in the specification.10FIGUREProtocol simulationIntruder simulationThis pictorial view in Figure 11 presents the knowledge about the role of intruder in the interruption of secret (message) exchanging between user (U) and base station (BS). No doubt the intruder here tries to take the role of either U or BS. But is unable to access the secret between U and BS because of the special identity base attributes and keys used for the security of the secret. The attributes and keys that provides the authenticity between U and BS under the serious attacks of intruders.11FIGUREIntruder simulationFormal validation of proposed protocol between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS)Before the user (U) and UAV (D) start to exchange the critical information. Both of them have to show their authenticity within the network with the base station (BS), so that the collected information could be trusted in terms of integrity, confidentiality and free from other active and passive attacks due to presence of intruders.In Figure 12, both the user (U) and UAV (D) send their identity‐based credentials or attributes to the base station (BS) for authentication by using public key (Ks) respectively. Once the positive acknowledgment comes from the stored trustlist of the base station (BS) for both of them. They start to play their individual roles independently for the information exchange. The information sharing starts with local variable “state: nat, Nu: text, S:text”. For the transition to occur you need to start from state = 0 to RCV (start). The “start” is the specific message that is sent by Avispa Tool to start the communication. And there starts the send and receive request process from User (U) to UAV (D) encapsulated within the respective credentials and public key parameters (SND ({U.D.Nu}_Kd)) and RCV ({U.D.Nu.S}_Ku). In this way the user (U) proves its authenticity for information sharing to the UAV (D).12FIGURERole specification of user (U) with UAV (D)In Figure 13, the role is played by the UAV (D). In this implementation the UAV (D) proves its authenticity back to the user (U). Because for information exchange authenticity is important for every entity within the network as it is always under the intruder vision. So the UAV (D) send its identity based credentials with involvement of public key parameters (SND ({U.D.Nu’}_Ku)) and RCV ({U.D.Nu’.S}_Kd to the user (U) in the same way as above. In this way UAV (D) proves its authenticity within the network.13FIGURERole specification of UAV (D) with user (U)Figure 14 explains the composition of session role that are going in parallel with each other. It means the roles played by both user (U) and the UAV (D) are going side by side. Due to which the information sharing is going in full duplex mode that is role _D (D, U, S, Ku, Kd, SND2, RCV2) // role_ U (U, D, Ku, Kd, SND1, RCV1).14FIGURERole specification for sessionFigure 15 presents environment and goal specification of the proposed protocol. The environment section defines the constants in HLPSL that are used for the validation of the proposed protocols. The constants that are taken to define the parameters used in the implementation of proposed protocol that is Ku, Kd, S1etc. (shown in figure). Also, in this section the intruder knowledge about the parameters of the network is taken into consideration. Figure 15 also defines the goal of our proposed protocol validation. Here the aim is to show that the secret S between D and U is secure or unsecure under the knowledge of intruder attacks.15FIGURERoles specification for environment and goalFigure 16 presents the summary of the validation of proposed protocols and shows whether the implemented protocol is Safe or Unsafe under the knowledge of intruder. It is clear from the Figure 16 that the validation of this protocol is SAFE when it is executed by verification tool CL‐AtSe in AVISPA Tool. Hence the proposed protocol is authenticated and can be used as security for secure exchange of information between user (U) and UAV (D).16FIGUREResult of proposed protocol using CL‐AtSePictorial view of protocol validation between user (U) and UAV (D)In AVISPA Tool, there are also options available for the simulation outputs. And there are two tools available for the simulation outputs in AVISPA Tool.Protocol Simulation ToolIntruder Simulation ToolProtocol simulationThe Protocol simulation tool provides the animated or graphical specification as shown in Figure 17. Here you can see to build a message sketch chart between user playing the role as U and the UAV playing the role as D. When you trigger the option, it is clear from the chart and shows a message (secret) between U and D is protected with credentials (Nonce numbers) and keys (ku, kd) present in the specification.17FIGUREProtocol simulationIntruder simulationThe pictorial view in Figure 18 presents the knowledge about the role of intruder in the interruption of secret (message) exchanging between user (U) and UAV (D). No doubt the intruder here try to take the role of either U or D. But is unable to access the secret between U and D because of the special identity base attributes and keys used for the security of the secret. The attributes and keys that provide the authenticity between U and D are under the serious attacks of intruders.18FIGUREIntruder simulationDISCUSSIONThe validation and simulation outcomes of the proposed identity based authentication scheme clearly show its safeness from the vulnerability of the intruders within the network. The network where the proposed protocols have been implemented in two ways: between user (U) and base station (BS) and between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS). The existing challenges of many unknown attacks of intruders and other related issues like spoofing, airborne attacks, integrity issues etc. in UAV HetNet based networks have been solved by this security approach. Also, the traditional security approaches used in such network respectively were complex and constrained in terms of their management, energy, and memory. However, the proposed methodology is free from such kind of challenges. Basically, the discussion under our research work assures full security to the communicated information by offering the identity‐based credentials to the network entities. Therefore, only the authenticated ones (UAV, USER,) whose credentials are validated in the trustlist stored at the base station (S) can access the information collected by UAVs used against enemies in combat zones. In this way proposed protocol approach provide safety to the secret information of users from the serious and vulnerable threats in the network because the attackers would be unable to attack the data. So, the network will be free from integrity issues, impersonation, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spoofing, integrity threats, and privacy. Hence, the collaboration of the identity based authentication and UAV‐assisted HetNet, makes the network secure, robust and reliable against the intruder nodes, due to which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) assisted HetNets, using in combat zones by military operations result in secure surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance and carry aircraft ordnance such as missiles against the enemies.CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPEThis work suggests the implementation of smart security system for UAV‐integrated HetNet. As it is obvious that the UAV‐assisted HetNet face so many malicious and vulnerable attacks when used for multi‐purpose applications (civilian, military). So, it is necessary to provide the security measures in such networks against the intrusion of intruders. In this research work, the smarty security scheme collaborated with the given network is identity based authentication system. This smart security approach has been implemented in two phases—the first phase is between user (U) and base station (BS), and the second phase is in between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS). The simulation results of this proposed approach have been validated in the widely accepted AVISPA tool. And the results clearly show its safeness against the intruder activities. The essential implementation of this work includes critical military communication, in which military users safely collect the reconnaissance information from combat zones. Thus, AVISPA Tool helps in validating data confidentiality and ensuring authentication within the communication network. Such authentication process would help to protect the credibility of legitimate network knowledge.In future, the research on energy is needed to enhance the lifespan of UAVs and limit overhead communication. Also, there is an issue of memory constraint related to UAVs for authentication of authorized users as the UAV have to store trustlist to authenticate each valid user independently that is without involvement of main base station. Research work is also needed to improve the scalability of the proposed network. The future work using this scheme can be summarized as:Reducing the overhead communication.Enhancing the lifetime of UAVs by using powerful rechargeable batteries.The increase on the scalability of the system is an open future direction.No doubt the essence of the space‐air‐ground embedded network for multi‐purpose applications is growing day by day, but it raising the embedded network is a challenging task that includes air‐to‐ground channel modelling, optimal deployment, energy efficiency, path planning, resource management etc.Moreover, the proposed methodology can also be validated with another existing Tool known as Pro‐Verif that can further give sureness of its safeness for UAV‐aided HetNets.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONSAabid Wani: Conceptualization, Data curation, Methodology, Validation, Writing original draft. Sachin Gupta: Supervision, Validation. Zeba Khanam: Writing review & editing. Mamoon Rashid: Validation, Writing review & editing. Sultan Alshamrani: Formal analysis. Mohammad Baz: Funding acquisition, Writing review & editing.CONFLICT OF INTERESTThe authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENTData in this research paper will be shared on request to the corresponding author.ABBREVIATIONSTermFull formUAVUnmanned aerial vehicleIBAIdentity based schemeHLPSLHigh level protocol specification languageAVISPAAutomated validation internet security protocols and applicationsIoTInternet of thingsQoSQuality of serviceNOMANon‐orthogonal multiple accessD2DDevice to deviceMTCMachine‐top communicationseMBBEnhanced mobile broadbandURLLCLow‐latency communicationFANETFlying ad hoc networksPKCPublic key cryptographyCL‐ATSEConstraint logic‐based attack searcherOFMCOn‐the‐fly model‐checkerSATMCSAT‐based model‐checkerTA4SPTree automated based on automatic security protocol analysis approximationsREFERENCESZhang, Y., Yu, R., Xie, S., Yao, W., Xiao, Y., Guizani, M.: Home M2M networks: architectures, standards, and QoS improvement. 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K.: A new user identity based authentication, using security and distributed for cloud computing. IOP Conf. Ser.: Mater. Sci. Eng. 748(1), 012026 (2020) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png IET Intelligent Transport Systems Wiley

A novel approach for securing data against adversary attacks in UAV embedded HetNet using identity based authentication scheme

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Abstract

INTRODUCTIONFor facilitating Internet of Things (IoT) utilities with varying quality of service (QoS) specifications in distinct realistic cases (viz metropolitan, remote, and densely congested zones), it is vital to harness the significant benefits of each networking structure [1]. For illustration, sparsely dispatched terrestrial networks in metropolitan regions could offer high maximum throughput access, UAV‐assisted wireless networking systems could provide extensive coverage and effortless networking to even the most remote and sparse dense areas. UAV communications can also endorse established cellular communications for fast service growth and serve value‐effective offloading of the overly crowded regions [2]. Nowadays, the current infrastructure cannot wholly accommodate individually the need to process massive amounts of information and incorporate large‐scale applications like big data, Internet of Things, cloud computing etc.From an air‐based network, due to swap limitations, a broad range of unpiloted flying devices, which include UAVs, spaceships or balloons, can be confined to distinct operational elevations. In overall, a UAV is configured with transceivers to have a community of ground clients with adaptable access to the internet, and an unmanned aircraft room is the accompanying broadcasting region. The scale of the unmanned aircraft enclosure is governed with the elevation, proximity, transmission power, and environmental conditions of the UAV. Besides, the UAV swarm is linked by preserving UAV‐to‐UAV connections in order to excess facilities mutually beneficial. The multi‐tiered unmanned aircraft platform not only serves regulating signals swapping between UAVs in order to eliminate obstacles and measure flying trajectories, and also provides information for mobile device access. Unique pilotless vehicles are trained with diverse network frameworks like LTE (Long Term Evolution) or Wifi communicate with infrastructure and services or satellites that define access points between multilevel UAV networks and other structures. The UAV may use a sky‐haul link to the satellites or link via a backhaul connection to the surface network [3]. Also, for last decades the usage of unmanned vehicles improved to the large extent in most of daily applications. The applications mostly include unpredictable occurrences which could not be stopped, namely, Calamities, country defence, quest, rescue and, mainly, military surveillance [4]. Figure 1 presents UAV embedded HetNet description.1FIGUREStructure of UAV embedded HetNetA HetNet network composes of picocells, small cells and macro cells, femtocells that help portable users including cell phones, IoT applications, self‐driving cars, and many others shown in Figure 3, generating an inexorably intertwined structure of emerging technologies for 5G wireless devices. This encompasses all interesting wireless 5G small cells technologies, such as mm‐wave range of frequencies, energy harnessing, NOMA (non‐orthogonal multiple access) transmission, and D2D (device to device) connectivity, and has recently become an essential research topic. Moreover, the continually rising computational capacity of mobile equipment could be programmed for mobile edge computing (MEC), in which unmanned aircrafts could program computational jobs while onboard computer systems conduct such assignments. And together with this, famous details can be stored on UAVs or ground devices and distributed around end equipment's through drone cells or D2D connectivity.Not only does the UAV optimized HetNets surmount the extra demand power of users. Besides it also reduces latency and delay by using appropriate network optimization algorithms thereby increasing the user's performance significantly. With these enormous capabilities, the UAV strengthened consumer trust in its use in critical situations such as natural disasters as well as in the compilation of identification data from combat zones etc. However, the data collected for tracking specific scenarios with the assistance of this network should be secure from adverse threats. It is because the attackers can target data confidentiality, integrity, interception and protection, which can lead to unauthorized interception and indeed make room as an authorized entity. In order to overcome these problems, a robust authentication system exists that makes it difficult for intruders to breach network privacy. Therefore, security system would rely on identity‐based standards that must be validated by all authorized users in the network before sensitive communication. Therefore, both the server and UAVs will provide data protection for the network nodes. Therefore, UAV integrated HetNets will become a reliable network in terms of privacy and security. So, this increases the usage of UAV‐assisted HetNets in many applications like serving civilian, natural disasters, and particularly in defence jobs.BackgroundWith the accomplishment of present wireless connectivity has indeed provoked an increase in the amount of mobile internet traffic for impending 5G wireless networks and above 5G (B5G). The worldwide mobile traffic would achieve 1 zettabyte/mo by 2028, as per the latest report [5]. It will result in the existing infrastructure dealing with high needs for potential as well as setting a significant strain on mobile operators in terms of higher capital expenditures and operating expenses. In order to satisfy all such expanding requests, several initial attempts were devoted to HetNets (heterogeneous networks) (i.e. deploying different tiny cells) [6].Furthermore, in unforeseen or extreme situations (like battlefields and rehabilitation of delivery), the installation of earth‐based infrastructure seems to be economically unfeasible and difficult due to increased capital expenditures and complex and turbulent atmospheres. In exchange to tackle this problem, intelligent heterogeneous structure by harnessing unmanned aircraft (aerial vehicles) [7] has been deemed the valuable advanced standard for promoting some fundamental consumption framework of upcoming wireless devices, like massive machine‐top communications (MTC), enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) with bandwidth‐consuming and extremely‐reliable low‐latency communication (URLLC). Unmanned aircraft could take part in a pivotal task in offering catastrophe‐stricken geographic area network service healing, strengthening public security infrastructures, or coping with other emergencies when URLLC is needed. UAV‐helped HetNets in specific can be considered a key counterbalance to 5 G cellular networks [8]. UAVs are thus recognized as a valuable part of wireless 5G/B5G innovations.UAVs are used as airborne information sharing devices (namely, gliding ground stations or portable circuits) by escalating transceivers to have and improve high traffic demand surface‐to‐surface facilities as well as crowded situations, usually specified as UAV‐assisted networks [9–13]. Whereas UAVs are used as airborne endpoints to inspire the wide range of options from freight to surveillance, commonly known as infrastructure‐based UAVs [14, 15]. Besides, much of the ongoing work is confined to UAVs in support of cellular connectivity. UAVs have been fitted with electronic tools or engaged detectors in most current circumstances that can enable various applications such as post‐disaster evacuation, low altitude surveillance, connectivity assistance deployment and logistics. In addition, to endorse wireless internet connectivity in a massive particular region, a wasp of unmanned aircrafts establishing flying ad hoc networks (FANETs) [16, 17] and interacting with surface endpoints.Research objective, motivation and contributionThe main aim of this research work is to provide the trustiness of the users exchanging the information over the given network in terms of safety and privacy. Security and privacy are important considerations in UAV supported HetNets because of vulnerable exploits within it. The interaction in HetNets supported by UAV is often performed by wireless media, which is susceptible to eavesdropping and person in the centre assault. In fact, the complexity of the heterogeneity‐related tools, applications, and network environments demands more complicated protection control. From the other side, UAV integrated HetNets are designed on constrained‐tools, which are resource‐limited, for example, energy and processing abilities, so it will not be viable to incorporate complicated security solution in such a network, for example, it must be “lightweight” and effective. Concisely, it is essential to develop a protection structure for a defined infrastructure that would be resource intensive and at the same time successful in managing security management problems. So, the given network UAV‐integrated HetNets are provided with one of the computationally lightweight security algorithm known as identity based authentication algorithm. The characteristics of computationally lightweight is because of not involvement of PKI (central authority). And hence the network entities have to just authenticate, sign, and transact encrypted information among them. In this way the network security rises up to the satisfactory level of interest for the authorized users in the given network.Scope of this research workThe main focus of this research work is to implement the identity‐based authentication scheme in UAV‐aided HetNets and securing communication against vulnerable threats of intruders. However, the issues related to the UAV in terms of energy constraints, storage and other technical faults have not been focused in such research article. Hence, this work is purely needed to achieve the security and privacy in military based missions that play crucial role in defence of the countries.The rest of this paper focusses on the topics: Section 2 discusses the existing literature review which has been carried out in the related work and introduces the research gap. Section 3 presents the concept of system model. Also, Section 4 provides the description of identity based cryptography. Section 5 explains the proposed technique that has been carried out in UAV‐assisted HetNet in two phases—first phases between USER and BASE STATION, second phase between USER and UAV in presence of BASE STATION. Section 6 gives a brief description regarding the AVISPA tool and the validation with simulation of the two‐phase proposed mechanism has been performed in Section 6.1. Section 7 presents the discussion of the work carried out in this paper. Section 8 provides the conclusion of this research work and its future scope.RELATED WORKThe most important issue that has to be kept under consideration is their security measures. This section presents the relevant study that was explored in area of security of networks. In the current‐state of‐the‐art, the authors presented the serious design‐based threats that the UAVs face because they have been developed without any wireless security protocol and encryption scheme [37]. In another research work [50], the authors analysed the existing threats and vulnerabilities facing by UAVs like spoofing (GPS spoofing) [38, 39], malware infection [40, 41], data interference and interception [42–44], manipulation [45], natural issues [46, 47] and Wi‐Fi jamming [2, 15]. The authors of the paper implemented the rule‐based intrusion detection security scheme [48] in the UAV based network that suffer from several security attacks and challenges. The implemented scheme helps in detecting the false data injection attacks, especially those targeting the signal strength. They proved that the intruders could be traced within 40 s. However, this scheme suffers from the complexity management, which needs human involvement for protocol configuration. Also, this system was incapable in tracing the unknown intruder attacks. The research paper [49] worked out by the authors discussed the serious malicious vulnerabilities and attacks of Internet of Drones (IoD) system. The authors presented different cryptographic approaches and techniques against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spoofing, integrity threats, and privacy. However, the suggested approach has not been validated and simulated with any proper available security tool.Also because of presence of open links and dynamic topologies the embedded network has to face vulnerable attacks that can blank out mission‐critical zones by intentional jamming/disruption. The privacy and security is essential in UAV‐assisted networks as the UAVs are always unattended, by which the intruder can easily attack or capture them. In order to prevent these malicious and vulnerable modifications such as Denial of Services (DoS), man‐in‐the‐middle attack, message integrity etc. there is essence of lightweight and secure security system to avoid these attacks. So in cellular based UAV implementations, the Artificial Intelligence solutions were proposed addressing the security issues [51], However, a zero‐sum network ban game was espoused to acquire cyber‐physical potential threats in UAV delivery systems. [52]. In the wide geographical environment of interconnected space‐air‐ground networks, SDN (Software Defined Networks) controllers are accountable for handling resources and monitoring network activity, there is an immediate need to secure SDN controllers from multiple cyber‐attacks where attackers will wiretap the data and control signals sent via the UAV systems' radio links. Cyber‐attacks on UAV networks have been recorded in [53] and cyber‐security remains a big obstacle to be addressed in the actual use of UAVs. Hence it is necessary to design timely tactics and counter‐mechanisms to counter malicious cyber‐attacks.The paper's authors [54] centred on the assaults against small UAVs by recognizing fraudulent behaviours over their sensors. Sensors are designed in the proposed framework that detects cyber‐physical attacks, based on knowledge of the physical system and techniques of statistical analysis. However, the proposed scheme could not detect a combination of piece‐wise constant attacks of lesser magnitude. This research work [55] also suggested a specification‐based identification strategy to protect against cyber‐attacks in a UAV system. This study used a behaviour rule‐based UAV‐IDS (intrusion detection system) in which behaviour rules are designed based on defined models of attack, taking into account careless, unpredictable, and opportunistic attacks. This research eliminated detection errors (i.e. false positives and false negatives) based on the critical tradeoff between security and performance of UAVs.Along with the above work done in the literature review, Table 1 illustrates the comparative study of the existing schemes in the state‐of‐the‐art. Table 1 has been categorized into two various subsections. Section 1 focuses those works where identity based authentication security scheme has been implemented. And Section 2 provides the detailed comparison of various other security‐related existing works in the domain.1TABLEComparative study of the existing scheme in the state‐of‐the‐artSection 1—IB security scheme based reported workRef.Application zoneIssuesSecurity SchemeSimulation platformRemarks[56]Cloud computingAuthentication of users and services is a significant issue for trust and security of cloud computing.Identity‐based hierarchical model for cloud computing (IBHMCC)GridSim based on JavaLight weight and efficient than existing security systems.Especially more light weight user side.Section 2—Detailed comparison in other security related existing domainsRef.UAV usedHetNet usedType of networkType of attackRouting protocolSecurity approach/mechanismSimulation platformRemarks[18] [2018]YesNoNetworked UAVsCoagulation attackNilEncoding scheme has been used to improve the security of the physical layerMATLABIntroduces new attack known as coagulation attack.PDR diminishes dramatically during this assault and exceeds the cut‐off value beyond which the network is unworkable.iii. This attack also increases network latency beyond the threshold.[19] [2017]YesNoUAV NetworkGPS Spoofing attackWiFi attackNilJamming‐to‐noise sensing defence and multi‐antenna defence for GPS spoofingEnabling WPA2 and disabling SSID for WiFi attacksEttus USRP and GNU radioBuilt a track‐modify‐and‐replay program with affordable GPS.[20] [2018]YesNoCyber‐physical systems (CPS)Wireless attacksNilIdentity‐based encryption, along with selective data encryptionOMNET++Offers consistency in network by empowering nodes to act as cluster heads.[21] [2016]YesNoUAV networkCyber attacksDTNSystem of risk estimation based on beliefNs‐3Suggested an IDS‐based cyber‐detection system[22] [2018]YesNoNetworked UAVsMalicious attacksNilIDS approachesNilSurveys the key state‐of‐the‐art UAV‐IDS approaches.Examine problems of building a cyber‐physical UAV‐IDS network.[23] [2012]YesNoUnmanned aircraft system (UAS), CPSAttacks on integrity and privacy of CPSNilSpecification based IDSMonte‐Carlo simulation testUses lightweight specification based behaviour rules.The detection rate of UAS node can reach 100% for detecting attackers.[24] [2017]YesNoCommercial UAVsCyber‐attacks, hijacking problemNilSecure communication protocol for multi‐UAV and ground stationRaspberry PiUses online NTP server pool for NTP server.Uses lithium battery & MOSFET to disable UAV.[25] [2019]YesNo5G communication networkNilNilNilNilSurvey on UAV communication in 5G network is presented.[26] [2016]YesNoProfessional UAV networksMan‐in‐the‐middle attackNilXBee 868LP on‐board encryptionCommitted hardware encryptionApplication layer encryptionHardware design with telemetry, manual remote control, WiFi 802.11 and XBee 868LP chipsDiscusses security issues of professional UAVs.Performs a man‐in‐the‐middle attack and gives countermeasure.[27] [2018]NoNoNilIllegal copying of multimedia dataNilNon‐chaotic image encryption method using cyclic group and permutation techniques.For validation, 12 eight‐bit grayscale images have been taken as plain images of size 512×512The proposed scheme has two phases‐ confusion and diffusion phase.The proposed scheme is robust against several attacks.The vulnerability of the proposed scheme has not been studied.[28] [2015]NoNoPublic networksAdversary attacksNilEnhanced smart‐card based authenticated key agreement schemeAVISPAReview Jiang et al.’s scheme.Due to the limitations of the above scheme, the proposed scheme is given.Provides user anonymity.[29] [2017]NoNoOrganizational networksInsider attacksNilSituational crime theory and social bond theoryStructural equation modellingResults show that engagement in information security successfully decreases insider attacks.[30] [2018]NoNoInternet of ThingsNilNilIoT frameworks are consideredNilSurvey of security of 8 IoT frameworks has been done.PDR—Packet Delivery Ratio, DoS—Denial of Service, USRP—Universal Software Radio Peripheral, GPS—Global Positioning System, SSID—Service Set Identifier, IDS—Intrusion Detection System, DTN—Disruption‐Tolerant Networks, IP—Internet Protocol, PSC—Public Safety Communication, CRE—Cell Range Expansion, CPS—Cyber Physical System.SYSTEM MODELThe model that the authors take in this research article for implementing the identity‐based authentication (security) in military based missions is UAV‐assisted HetNet. Actually, the communication in the network between user and main base station can occur in two ways. First, directly through the channels created by small cells (pico, femto) available within the network. Second in presence of UAVs links created UAVs relay nodes present in the network. Therefore it becomes neccessary to secure links/channels in both cases for secure communication.Before going into the depth of this research work. It is important to keep certain important parameters under view regarding the taken system model shown in Table 2. This will help the readers about the technical parameters which have been taken into consideration on implementing the system model.2TABLESystem modelParametersSystemIllustrationNetwork securityIdentity based (IB)Contrasting from other security approaches. The identity based is computationally lightweight security Algorithm that improves confidentiality of data and the authenticity of the users within the network.Facilities allow by UAVsFunctions as relay nodes (UAVs)Relay nodes (UAVs) establishes the links between user and base station in information exchange that are out of line of sight.Working band for relay nodes (UAVs)L‐band and C‐bandFor establishing the secure links in communication. The UAVs working efficiently in L frequency band and C frequency band respectively.UAV mobility modelRandom waypoint modelBecause of its simplicity and efficiency. This model suits best for the relay nodes during communication.Place of UAVs (Altitude)Low altitude platform (LAP)The heights at which the UAVs are placed above the earth is in the range of 200–700 m.Modulation approachOrthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)The connectivity between user, UAV and base station would have OFDM modulation approach.IDENTITY‐BASED CRYPTOGRAPHYIn 1984 Shamir launched this concept earlier. Afterwards Boneh and Franklin effectively implemented a fully functional IBE scheme [31]. Identity‐based cryptosystem raises the issue of either third party authorization requirements or certificate authority. Alternatively, IBE scheme provides intelligible public key encryption licenses which are acquired from separate credentials to retrieve public keys. The public key of identity‐based system is an arbitrary sequence from any register, including name, date of birth, telephone number, fingerprint, Aadhaar code, and other special assets. Anyone who has a wide public with a secret typing scheme (Cryptographic Master Key) for private key calculation will then test the public key in identity‐based scheme [32]. This is all feasible only with the help of a secure registry that ensures such protection.In principle, identity‐based cryptographic security scheme focuses on using pairing or bilinear mapping. In the above deduction the two classes are mapped jointly.Let us suppose G and GT are a multiplicative cyclic group that includes all the large q prime order.Then we define mapping ê. G* G →GT, ê (u, v) ε GT, where u, v ε G.If the following properties are satisfied, this is known as bilinear mapping.(1)Bilinearity property: ê (ua, vb) = [ê (u, v)]ab, where u, v ε G, and a, b ε Zp.(2)Non‐ degeneracy property: if g is the generator of GT then ê (g, g) ≠ 1 (identity element in GT).(3)Computability: ê (u, v) should be efficiently computable where (u, v) ε G*G.In IBE implementation two types of pairing are available, namely, Weil Pairing and Tate Pairing. When implemented for computing restricted devices [33], Tate Pairing was calculated to be more effective than Weil Pairing.Algorithm IBE cryptographyIdentity Based system given by Boneh Franklin's consists of four randomized algorithms namely Encrypt, Setup, Decrypt an Extract as shown in Figure 2.SetupHere we take < p, G, GT, g, ê >.Define public parameter param = < p, g, Q, H1, H2 >.H1: {0, 1}*→ G, this will convert the user “Id” to the element in G of any arbitrary length.H2: GT→ {0, 1)l, means fixed length l.Generation of secret key for user.Encryption: Here we have public param = <p, g, Q = gα, H1, H2), Idi ε {0, 1}* and message m ε {0, 1}l. This will generate the cipher text CT = (C1, C2) where C1 = gr (r → Zp), C2 = m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), Q)r). This is called an encryption that takes place from sender to receiver.Decryption: This is the process that takes place at the receiver end and is reverse process of encryption.Here, m = C2 xor H2 (ê (SKId, C1)m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), Q)r) xor H2 (ê (H1(Id)α, gr))m xor H2 (ê (H1 (Idi), g)rα xor H2 (ê (H1(Id), g)rα = m (message).2FIGUREThe algorithm of IBEPROPOSED TECHNIQUEThe trustworthiness of the base station and small cells platform is motivated and encouraged by the calculated platform above base functions [34]. So, in the proposed technique of identity‐based security scheme of this network, the base station and small cells will be the trustworthy and reliable server for authorized users and UAVs. Also, the creation of trusted entities needs to be a safe and managed directly by the network owner. This in turn will help a non‐feasible based PKC (Public Key Cryptography) network to provide a healthier environment for monitoring and control the entire network. Moreover, in proposed identity‐based scheme no communication is required with the base server during authentication process. As just the receiver Id is valuable for the transmitter to encrypt the limited data. Hence, identity‐based security implementations use less memory to store the public keys of authorized users so that network becomes economically sound in terms of power consumptions. Thus, the scheme would guarantee secure communication with clients through an authentication process between UAV and base station respectively. Awareness of intruders throughout authentication process was taken into consideration. In many ways the attacker may target the channel of communication such as eavesdrop, hijack, alter, and impregnate some data. Those above equations are built into the “HLPSL” language and tested with the “AVISPA TOOL”.The base station and user authenticationIn this section the authentication process is discussed between the base station (S) and User (U). Upon building up the network, it is necessary for base stations to have their Nu′.hm_U${N}_u^{\prime}.{\rm{ hm\_U}}$ (for authentication) value and user Ids. Furthermore, it is necessary for users to have public keys and specific common parameters. Figure 3 demonstrates UAV‐integrated HetNet IBE prototype. For this case, the prototype written in HLPSL.3FIGUREThe user (U) and station (S) authenticationOn initiating the authentication process, first the user (U) send a request involving the identity based credentials (Nu′.hm_U′${N}_u^{\prime}.{\rm{ hm\_U}}^{\prime}$) to the base station (S) by using the public key of base station (Ks). The base station (S) accepts the request from user (U) and start to compare it with the credentials stored in the trustlist of base station (main server). If the match occurs between the recipient's credentials and the stored credentials, then the authentication would continue to process masquerading otherwise the process will abort. In process of authentication, the user has also to know is the base station authenticated one or one. For that the base station would send its own authenticating credential (Nv) with the credential of the user by using the public key of given user (Ku) that is S→U:SND({Nu′.Nv′}_Ku)${\rm{S}} \to {\rm{U}}:{\rm{\ SND}}( {\{ {{{\rm{N}}}_u^{\prime}.{{\rm{N}}}_v^{\prime}} \}\_{{\rm{K}}}_u} )$ which means base station (S) requests user (U) to authenticate as well. Once the user and base station will get agreed that both are authorized entities of the network and also satisfied that the channel is secure. Then the information exchange will start between them.1U→S:SNDNu′.hm_−U_−Ks$$\begin{equation}U \to S:SND\ {\left\{ {N_u^{\rm{{\prime}}}.\ {h}_m\_ - U} \right\}}\_ - {K}_s\end{equation}$$User (U) requests base station (S) to verify on hm value.2S:RcvU.S.Nu′.hm_−U_−KsinU.hm_−U,trustlist$$\begin{equation}S:Rcv \left( {U.S.{{\left\{ {N_u^{\prime}.\ {h}_m\_ - \ U} \right\}}}\_ - {K}_s} \right)in \left( {U.\ {h}_m\_ - \ U,\ trustlist} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) compares the recipient's hm_−U${h}_m\_ - \ U$ with the value in the trustlist.3S→U:SNDNu′.Nv′−Ku$$\begin{equation}S \to U:SND\left( {{{\left\{ {N_u^{\prime}.\ N_v^{\prime}} \right\}}}_ - \ {K}_u} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) requests user (U) to authenticate on Nv value.4U:RcvNu′.Nv′−Ku$$\begin{equation}U:Rcv \left( {{{\left\{ {N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}.\ N_v^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}}_ - \ {K}_u} \right)\end{equation}$$5U→S:SNDNv′−Ks$$\begin{equation}U \to S:SND{\left( {\left\{ {N_v^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}} \right)}_ - {K}_s\end{equation}$$User (U) requests base station (S) to authenticate Hm value.In this way the server (S) authenticate on hm_U value only when the Nu and Nv are authenticated successfully. This registered or we can say authenticated syntax is free of serious attacks. The base station can establish new list that contains the identification of trustworthy users due to successful authenticity of syntax. Thus, the newly established list is smaller (in terms of size) than the previous one (trust list) that is promoted amongst the registered users or can be placed on the server for more quick registration process. The users will transfer information which exists in newly established list with those of users who have ID. Within this web or chain the authorized users are honoured as long as they remain active or on ON mode. If failure happens for any reason, users have to re‐authenticate with the base station. If failure of re‐substantiation takes places it would delete the ID of the user from the trusted registry. Hence the consumers have to go for similar criteria to become part of web with fresh substantiation again.Authentication process between USER and UAV in presence of base stationIn this process, the users are verified by the UAV either by itself or with the help of station's assistance. Information contained by the user packet includes its ID (Idu, nonce number, and encrypted message (coded with general key)) and the address of the transmitter and receiver respectively. This helps the UAV to check the Idu with the Id available in the trust list saved in its internal memory or on the main server. If it happens, the server must identify the UAV, and the connection begins. The nonce plays a vital role in avoiding repeated attacks by invaders within the network. For this case, Figure 4 shows the authentication process. To be clear, symbols are listed in Table 3 for subsequent use.4FIGUREUser (U) and UAV via station (S) authentication3TABLESymbols used in this entire paperSymbolsDescriptionPPrime numberÊBilinear mappingΑSecret keyIdiUser identityLFixed length of bits*Arbitrary length of bitsSKiSecret key corresponding to receiver.GgeneratorH1, H2Hash functionsKGCKey generation centreZpPrime order mapMMessageCCipher textHm_UNew trust valueNu′${{\rm{N}}}_u^{\prime}$Nv′${{\rm{N}}}_v^{\prime}$Nonce random numbersKU, KSUser and station public keysSNDSend packet_KSEncrypted packet with KS public keyIdUUser node's identifierPvKUUser's private key.A.SSender ID. Receiver IDFirst technique: The authentication between user and UAV is going through main base station as the trust list is stored here. In this case the information exchange is started when the user (U) send data to UAV (D) with its own identity (Id U) by using the UAV's public key (Kd). Before giving back response to user's request for information exchange. There is need to authenticate user's identity first. Whether it is valid or not. For it the UAV would take help of main server (S) where the user's authenticity list is stored. So the UAV forwards the recipient's information to the base station (S) for checking its real identity. The base station is checking its identity by mapping the recipient's credentials with that of the stored ones in the trusted list. If the match occurs, the process would succeed otherwise aborted. So on matching the identity, the base station send an acknowledgment to the UAV and the UAV starts to communicate with the given user. This will get more cleared by the following Protocol models written in the High Level Protocol Specification Language or HLPSL6U:SND(U.D.IdUdata.Nu′−Kd$$\begin{equation}U:SND\ (U.D.IdU\ {\left\{ {data.\ N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}_{ - \ }{K}_d\end{equation}$$User (U) sends data with user identity (IdU) to UAV (D).7D:Rcv(U.D.IdUdata.Nu′−Kd$$\begin{equation}D:Rcv\ (U.D.\ IdU\ {\left\{ {data.N_u^{\rm{^{\prime}}}} \right\}}_ - \ {K}_d\end{equation}$$UAV (D) receives the data with its identity (IdU) from user (U).8SNDD.S.IdU$$\begin{equation}SND \left( {D.S.IdU} \right)\end{equation}$$Here the user's identity (IdU) received by UAV (D) is forwarded to base station (S) for an authentication.9S:RcvSNDD.S.U.IdU⋮⋱inU.IdU,trustlist=|>$$\begin{equation}S:Rcv\left( {SND \left( {D.S.U.IdU} \right)\vdots \ddots in \left( {U.IdU, trustlist} \right)} \right) = \ | &gt; \end{equation}$$Here the base station (S) receives the user's information from UAV (D) and mapped with the stored values of trustlist.10SNDS.D.OK$$\begin{equation}SND \left( {S.D.OK} \right)\end{equation}$$Base station (S) sends an acknowledgement signal to UAV (D).11D:RcvS.D.OK=|>SNDD.U.OK$$\begin{equation}D:Rcv\left( {S.D.OK} \right) = \ | &gt; SND \left( {D.U.OK} \right)\end{equation}$$UAV (D) receives the acknowledgement signal and authenticate the user.U: proceed with the next packet.Second technique: In this technique there is no involvement of main base station for user authentication instead the authentication is done by UAV itself. Rest of the process is same above but the benefit of this way is that, it is consuming less overhead communication than the first one. No doubt both techniques ensure improvement in data confidentiality and privacy in presence of intruder attacks.AVISPA TOOLAVISPA also known as push‐button tool has emerged to authenticate protocols and implementations of huge‐scale network security. The protocols are transposed into a language called as HLPSL (specification language for the High‐Level Protocol). Basic structure under the HLPSL signifies numerous respondents as well as role compositions. There is autonomy among the tasks, obtaining several initial information through variables, interacting with extra tasks by channels [35]. The output format of AVISPA Tool Figure () is generated using either Cl‐Atse (constraint logic‐based attack searcher), OFMC (on‐the‐fly model‐checker), SATMC (SAT‐based model‐checker), and TA4SP (Tree Automated based on Automatic Security Protocol Analysis Approximations) [36]. The flow chart of AVISPA is shown in Figure 5.5FIGUREFlow chart of AVISPA ToolThroughout this scenario, it is assumed that the security protocols presented by HLPSL are simulated in presence of intrusion assaults. It means the intruder has a full control over the given network. And there are number of ways shown below.The intruder can start any number of parallel protocol sessions.The intruder knows all the public data of the protocol.The intruder has all the privileges / keys of corrupted agents.The intruder can read, store, block every sent message.The intruder can build and send messages.The intruder can encrypt or decrypt if he has/she the key.In nutshell, the intruder has power to target confidentiality of information, the integrity of messages, and also can act as interceptors between many authorized users, and as an authorized individual (Dolev‐Yao model). Under ATMC and OFMC back‐end options, the simulation output or execution of this security protocol provides the “SUMMARY” whether the protocol is SAFE or UNSAFE or whether the analysis is incomplete.Validation of proposed protocolsThe proposed protocols discussed above for the privacy of the UAV‐assisted HetNets need to be validating to check their authenticity and satisfaction for the users. Whether these protocols can be trusted or not for the information exchange through this network. The AVISPA Tool available as open‐source software helps to validate formally these proposed protocols. The formal validation done in two cases.Between user and base stationBetween user and UAV with the help of base stationFormal validation of proposed protocol between user (U) and base station (BS)In this section, the implemented proposed protocols are validated in AVISPA Tool between user and base station. The validation is expressed in terms of roles that are formulated using HLPSL. The roles in AVISPA Tool are session, goal, and environment. These roles are dependent on each other. Hence the validation of first role will proceed to the next one and so on. The roles played by agents in the proposed protocol are designed with proper symbols shown in the given figures. For example, for this case the symbol for user (agent) is U and for the base Station (agent) is BS. On the validation of this role the BS knows the authentication of the User (U) from its specific credentials or attributes as well as authenticates itself to the User (U). From Figure 6, it is clear that the User (U) send its identity with Secret (s) encrypted in a public key of BS (Ks) that is U → BS: (BS. U. Nv. s) _Ks. The BS here knows itself, the user (U) and the SND and RCV channels (dy). At starting the BS (agent) does not know the secret (S). So, the local variable which is any natural number or nonce number (nat) is taken into account and is initialized to “0” that is state: = 0. After that the BS receives the message, the identity of User (U) and a text S’ which does not know by BS. For the transition to occur you need to start from state = 0 to RCV (start). The “start” is the specific message that is sent by Avispa Tool to start the protocol. When it is true, it goes to a different state that is from State: = 0 to State: = 1. On transition, the BS acknowledges to U with its own identity by using the public key of U (Ku) and assures itself to U about the satisfaction of real identity (SND ({BS.U.Nv’}_Ku). Once the U gets assurance from the BS. There occurs a transition from State = 1 to State = 2 and BS starts to trust and allows the User (U) for the information exchange.6FIGURERole specification of base station (BS) in HLPSL of proposed protocolFigure 7 explains the role played by User (U). The role is started with a local variable called “state” which is assigned with a random number or nonce number that is (state: nat) and text which is actually credential of User (Nv). At starting that state is intialized with a “0”. After that the transition occurs from State = 0 to State = 1 . If the received information from user is matched with the credentials stored in the trust list of the BS. It mean here the User (U) authenticates itself to BS by involving its own specific attribute under HLPSL label witness (U,BS,auth_1,Nv’)7FIGURERole specification of user (U) in HLPSL of proposed protocolFigure 8 explains the composition of session role that are going in parallel with each other. It means the roles played by both base station (BS) and the user (U) are going side by side for authentication and result in a secure information exchange. Also, there is an environment section where we define the constants in HLPSL that are used for the validation of the proposed protocols. The intruder knowledge is also taken into account in this section. And it defines on what parameters the intruder has control over the network. For example, for this protocol the intruder has control over station, user and public key. This Figure () also defines the goal of our proposed protocol validation. Here the aim is to show that the secret S between BS and U is secure or unsecure. It means the protocol validation is authenticated between Station and user even intruder have full control over the network.8FIGURERole specification of session, environment and goal in HLPSLFigure 9 presents the summary of the validation of proposed protocols and shows whether the implemented protocol is safe or unsafe under the knowledge of intruder. It is clear from the Figure () that the validation of this protocol is safe when it is executed by verification tool CL‐AtSe in AVISPA Tool. Hence the proposed protocol is authenticated and can be used as security for secure exchange of information between user (U) and base station (BS).9FIGURESummary specification in HLPSLPictorial view of protocol validation between Base Station (BS) and User (U)In AVISPA Tool, there are also options available for the simulation outputs. There are two tools available for the simulation outputs in AVISPA Tool.Protocol Simulation ToolIntruder Simulation ToolProtocol simulationThe protocol simulation tool provides the animated or graphical specification as shown in Figure 10. Here you can see to build a message sketch chart between user playing the role as U and the base station playing the role as BS. When you trigger the option, it is clear from the chart and shows a message (secret) between U and BS protected with credentials and keys present in the specification.10FIGUREProtocol simulationIntruder simulationThis pictorial view in Figure 11 presents the knowledge about the role of intruder in the interruption of secret (message) exchanging between user (U) and base station (BS). No doubt the intruder here tries to take the role of either U or BS. But is unable to access the secret between U and BS because of the special identity base attributes and keys used for the security of the secret. The attributes and keys that provides the authenticity between U and BS under the serious attacks of intruders.11FIGUREIntruder simulationFormal validation of proposed protocol between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS)Before the user (U) and UAV (D) start to exchange the critical information. Both of them have to show their authenticity within the network with the base station (BS), so that the collected information could be trusted in terms of integrity, confidentiality and free from other active and passive attacks due to presence of intruders.In Figure 12, both the user (U) and UAV (D) send their identity‐based credentials or attributes to the base station (BS) for authentication by using public key (Ks) respectively. Once the positive acknowledgment comes from the stored trustlist of the base station (BS) for both of them. They start to play their individual roles independently for the information exchange. The information sharing starts with local variable “state: nat, Nu: text, S:text”. For the transition to occur you need to start from state = 0 to RCV (start). The “start” is the specific message that is sent by Avispa Tool to start the communication. And there starts the send and receive request process from User (U) to UAV (D) encapsulated within the respective credentials and public key parameters (SND ({U.D.Nu}_Kd)) and RCV ({U.D.Nu.S}_Ku). In this way the user (U) proves its authenticity for information sharing to the UAV (D).12FIGURERole specification of user (U) with UAV (D)In Figure 13, the role is played by the UAV (D). In this implementation the UAV (D) proves its authenticity back to the user (U). Because for information exchange authenticity is important for every entity within the network as it is always under the intruder vision. So the UAV (D) send its identity based credentials with involvement of public key parameters (SND ({U.D.Nu’}_Ku)) and RCV ({U.D.Nu’.S}_Kd to the user (U) in the same way as above. In this way UAV (D) proves its authenticity within the network.13FIGURERole specification of UAV (D) with user (U)Figure 14 explains the composition of session role that are going in parallel with each other. It means the roles played by both user (U) and the UAV (D) are going side by side. Due to which the information sharing is going in full duplex mode that is role _D (D, U, S, Ku, Kd, SND2, RCV2) // role_ U (U, D, Ku, Kd, SND1, RCV1).14FIGURERole specification for sessionFigure 15 presents environment and goal specification of the proposed protocol. The environment section defines the constants in HLPSL that are used for the validation of the proposed protocols. The constants that are taken to define the parameters used in the implementation of proposed protocol that is Ku, Kd, S1etc. (shown in figure). Also, in this section the intruder knowledge about the parameters of the network is taken into consideration. Figure 15 also defines the goal of our proposed protocol validation. Here the aim is to show that the secret S between D and U is secure or unsecure under the knowledge of intruder attacks.15FIGURERoles specification for environment and goalFigure 16 presents the summary of the validation of proposed protocols and shows whether the implemented protocol is Safe or Unsafe under the knowledge of intruder. It is clear from the Figure 16 that the validation of this protocol is SAFE when it is executed by verification tool CL‐AtSe in AVISPA Tool. Hence the proposed protocol is authenticated and can be used as security for secure exchange of information between user (U) and UAV (D).16FIGUREResult of proposed protocol using CL‐AtSePictorial view of protocol validation between user (U) and UAV (D)In AVISPA Tool, there are also options available for the simulation outputs. And there are two tools available for the simulation outputs in AVISPA Tool.Protocol Simulation ToolIntruder Simulation ToolProtocol simulationThe Protocol simulation tool provides the animated or graphical specification as shown in Figure 17. Here you can see to build a message sketch chart between user playing the role as U and the UAV playing the role as D. When you trigger the option, it is clear from the chart and shows a message (secret) between U and D is protected with credentials (Nonce numbers) and keys (ku, kd) present in the specification.17FIGUREProtocol simulationIntruder simulationThe pictorial view in Figure 18 presents the knowledge about the role of intruder in the interruption of secret (message) exchanging between user (U) and UAV (D). No doubt the intruder here try to take the role of either U or D. But is unable to access the secret between U and D because of the special identity base attributes and keys used for the security of the secret. The attributes and keys that provide the authenticity between U and D are under the serious attacks of intruders.18FIGUREIntruder simulationDISCUSSIONThe validation and simulation outcomes of the proposed identity based authentication scheme clearly show its safeness from the vulnerability of the intruders within the network. The network where the proposed protocols have been implemented in two ways: between user (U) and base station (BS) and between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS). The existing challenges of many unknown attacks of intruders and other related issues like spoofing, airborne attacks, integrity issues etc. in UAV HetNet based networks have been solved by this security approach. Also, the traditional security approaches used in such network respectively were complex and constrained in terms of their management, energy, and memory. However, the proposed methodology is free from such kind of challenges. Basically, the discussion under our research work assures full security to the communicated information by offering the identity‐based credentials to the network entities. Therefore, only the authenticated ones (UAV, USER,) whose credentials are validated in the trustlist stored at the base station (S) can access the information collected by UAVs used against enemies in combat zones. In this way proposed protocol approach provide safety to the secret information of users from the serious and vulnerable threats in the network because the attackers would be unable to attack the data. So, the network will be free from integrity issues, impersonation, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, spoofing, integrity threats, and privacy. Hence, the collaboration of the identity based authentication and UAV‐assisted HetNet, makes the network secure, robust and reliable against the intruder nodes, due to which unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) assisted HetNets, using in combat zones by military operations result in secure surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance and carry aircraft ordnance such as missiles against the enemies.CONCLUSION AND FUTURE SCOPEThis work suggests the implementation of smart security system for UAV‐integrated HetNet. As it is obvious that the UAV‐assisted HetNet face so many malicious and vulnerable attacks when used for multi‐purpose applications (civilian, military). So, it is necessary to provide the security measures in such networks against the intrusion of intruders. In this research work, the smarty security scheme collaborated with the given network is identity based authentication system. This smart security approach has been implemented in two phases—the first phase is between user (U) and base station (BS), and the second phase is in between user (U) and UAV (D) in presence of base station (BS). The simulation results of this proposed approach have been validated in the widely accepted AVISPA tool. And the results clearly show its safeness against the intruder activities. The essential implementation of this work includes critical military communication, in which military users safely collect the reconnaissance information from combat zones. Thus, AVISPA Tool helps in validating data confidentiality and ensuring authentication within the communication network. Such authentication process would help to protect the credibility of legitimate network knowledge.In future, the research on energy is needed to enhance the lifespan of UAVs and limit overhead communication. Also, there is an issue of memory constraint related to UAVs for authentication of authorized users as the UAV have to store trustlist to authenticate each valid user independently that is without involvement of main base station. Research work is also needed to improve the scalability of the proposed network. The future work using this scheme can be summarized as:Reducing the overhead communication.Enhancing the lifetime of UAVs by using powerful rechargeable batteries.The increase on the scalability of the system is an open future direction.No doubt the essence of the space‐air‐ground embedded network for multi‐purpose applications is growing day by day, but it raising the embedded network is a challenging task that includes air‐to‐ground channel modelling, optimal deployment, energy efficiency, path planning, resource management etc.Moreover, the proposed methodology can also be validated with another existing Tool known as Pro‐Verif that can further give sureness of its safeness for UAV‐aided HetNets.AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONSAabid Wani: Conceptualization, Data curation, Methodology, Validation, Writing original draft. Sachin Gupta: Supervision, Validation. Zeba Khanam: Writing review & editing. Mamoon Rashid: Validation, Writing review & editing. Sultan Alshamrani: Formal analysis. Mohammad Baz: Funding acquisition, Writing review & editing.CONFLICT OF INTERESTThe authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest to report regarding the present study.DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENTData in this research paper will be shared on request to the corresponding author.ABBREVIATIONSTermFull formUAVUnmanned aerial vehicleIBAIdentity based schemeHLPSLHigh level protocol specification languageAVISPAAutomated validation internet security protocols and applicationsIoTInternet of thingsQoSQuality of serviceNOMANon‐orthogonal multiple accessD2DDevice to deviceMTCMachine‐top communicationseMBBEnhanced mobile broadbandURLLCLow‐latency communicationFANETFlying ad hoc networksPKCPublic key cryptographyCL‐ATSEConstraint logic‐based attack searcherOFMCOn‐the‐fly model‐checkerSATMCSAT‐based model‐checkerTA4SPTree automated based on automatic security protocol analysis approximationsREFERENCESZhang, Y., Yu, R., Xie, S., Yao, W., Xiao, Y., Guizani, M.: Home M2M networks: architectures, standards, and QoS improvement. 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Published: Nov 1, 2023

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