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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12171
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In this paper, we propose an alternative model for capture that is based not on reciprocity but on congruence of interests between the firm and the regulator. A regulator is charged by a political principal to provide an imperfect signal for the type of a regulated firm. Only the firm can observe its type, and the production of a signal is costly. The firm can provide a costless alternative signal of lower accuracy to the regulator. In a self‐enforcing equilibrium, the regulator transmits the firm‐produced signal and saves information‐gathering costs, and the firm enjoys higher information rents.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jul 1, 2017
Keywords: ; ; ;