Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal‐agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi‐experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives—as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate

Download PDF
19 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/agency-problems-the-17th-amendment-and-representation-in-the-senate-5BJW7G1eXF
Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©2009, Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00373.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

A prominent change in American electoral institutions occurred when the 17th Amendment to the Constitution established direct election of U.S. Senators as of 1914. How did this change the political agency relationship between the mass electorate and U.S. Senators? We develop theoretical expectations about the representational effects of direct election by a relatively inexpert mass electorate and indirect election by a relatively expert political intermediary, based on principal‐agent theory. The chief predictions are that the representative will be more responsive to the mass electorate under direct election, but will also have more discretion to pursue his or her own ends. We use the 17th Amendment as a quasi‐experiment to test the predictions of the theory. Statistical models show strong support for both predictions. Moreover, the 17th Amendment is not associated with similar changes in the U.S. House of Representatives—as expected, since the amendment did not change House electoral institutions.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science – Wiley

Published: Apr 1, 2009

References

  • Optimal Retention in Agency Problems
    Banks, Banks; Sundaram, Sundaram
  • The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model
    Barro, Barro
  • Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy‐making: The Reagan Defense Buildup
    Bartels, Bartels
  • What to Do (and Not Do) with Time Series‐Cross Section Data
    Beck, Beck; Katz, Katz
  • The Remaking of an American Senate: The 17th Amendment and Ideological Responsiveness
    Bernhard, Bernhard; Sala, Sala
  • Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
    Besley, Besley; Case, Case
  • Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
    Besley, Besley; Coate, Coate
  • Explaining Divided U.S. Senate Delegations, 1788–1996: A Realignment Approach
    Brunell, Brunell; Grofman, Grofman
  • Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting
    Canes‐Wrone, Canes‐Wrone; Brady, Brady; Cogan, Cogan
  • Strategy, Selection, and Candidate Competition in U.S. House and Senate Elections
    Carson, Carson
  • A Not So Distant Mirror: The Senate and Congressional Change
    Crook, Crook; Hibbing, Hibbing
  • Stacking the States, Stacking the House: The Politics of Congressional Redistricting in the 19th Century
    Engstrom, Engstrom
  • Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control
    Ferejohn, Ferejohn
  • State Supreme Courts in American Democracy: Probing the Myths of Judicial Reform
    Hall, Hall
  • The Effect of Judicial Institutions on Uncertainty and the Rate of Litigation: The Election versus Appointment of State Judges
    Hanssen, Hanssen
  • Partisan Advantage and Constitutional Change: The Case of the Seventeenth Amendment
    King, King; Ellis, Ellis
  • How Do Senators Vote? Disentangling the Role of Voter Preferences, Party Affiliation, and Senator Ideology
    Levitt, Levitt
  • Institutional Change and the Electoral Connection in the Senate: Revisiting the Effects of Direct Election
    Meinke, Meinke
  • Constituency Influence in Congress
    Miller, Miller; Stokes, Stokes
  • Equilibrium Party Government
    Patty, Patty
  • The Polarization of American Politics
    Poole, Poole; Rosenthal, Rosenthal
  • The Senate and American Federalism
    Riker, Riker
  • Regionalism, Rotten Boroughs, Race, and Realignment: The Seventeenth Amendment and the Politics of Representations
    Wirls, Wirls