Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/an-optimal-auction-with-identity-dependent-externalities-Tj4nfyST7y
References (17)
-
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu, E. Stacchetti (1996)
How (not) to sell nuclear weaponsThe American Economic Review, 86
-
Eric Gould, B. (Deceased), Canice Prendergast (2002)
Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping MallsReview of Economics and Statistics, 87
-
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu, E. Stacchetti (1999)
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with ExternalitiesJournal of Economic Theory, 85
-
I. Segal (1997)
Contracting with ExternalitiesMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
R. Myerson (1981)
Optimal Auction DesignMath. Oper. Res., 6
-
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu (2001)
Efficient Design with Interdependent ValuationsEconometrica, 69
-
Paul Milgrom, I. Segal (2002)
Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice SetsEconometrica, 70
-
Jonathan Levin (1997)
An Optimal Auction for ComplementsGames and Economic Behavior, 18
-
Gopal Varma (2002)
Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent ExternalitiesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 33
-
B. Pashigian, Eric Gould (1998)
Internalizing Externalities: the Pricing of Space in Shopping Malls1The Journal of Law and Economics, 41
-
E. Maskin, J. Riley, F. Hahn (1989)
Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions -
J. Brueckner (1993)
Inter-store externalities and space allocation in shopping centersThe Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 7
-
B. Pashigian, Eric Gould (1998)
Contracts, Externalities, and Incentives in Shopping Malls: An Empirical Analysis -
(2001)
Optimal Monopolistic Selling under Uncertainty: Does Price -
N. Figueroa, Vasiliki Skreta (2007)
The Role of Outside Options in Auction DesignMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu (2000)
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among BuyersThe RAND Journal of Economics, 31
-
Segal Segal (1999)
Contracting with ExternalitiesQuarterly Journal of Economics, 114
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2008, RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00036.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We analyze the problem of a seller of multiple identical units of a good who faces a set of buyers with unit demands, private information, and identity‐dependent externalities. We derive the seller's optimal mechanism and characterize its main properties. We show that the probability that a buyer obtains a unit is an increasing function of the externalities he generates and enjoys. Also, the seller's allocation of the units of the good need not be ex post efficient. As an illustration, we apply the model to the problem faced by a developer of a shopping mall who wants to allocate and price its retail space among anchor and non‐anchor stores. We show that a commonly used sequential mechanism is not optimal unless externalities are large enough.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2008