Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/auctions-and-information-acquisition-sealed-bid-or-dynamic-formats-jhAmZ5YNhI
References (29)
-
Lixin Ye (2007)
Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctionsGames Econ. Behav., 58
-
Ronald Harstad (1990)
Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free EntryJournal of Political Economy, 98
-
R. McAfee, J. Mcmillan (1987)
Auctions with entryEconomics Letters, 23
-
Athey (2001)
Single Crossing Properties and the Existenceof Pure Strategy Equilibriain Games of Incomplete InformationEconometrica
-
N. Persico (2000)
Information acquisition in auctionsEconometrica, 68
-
M. Stegeman (1996)
Participation Costs and Efficient AuctionsJournal of Economic Theory, 71
-
Gopal Varma (2002)
Standard Auctions with Identity-Dependent ExternalitiesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 33
-
Lawrence Ausubel, Paul Milgrom (2002)
Ascending Auctions with Package BiddingThe B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 1
-
Olivier Compte, P. Jehiel (2004)
The Wait-and-See Option in Ascending Price AuctionsJournal of the European Economic Association, 2
-
Hausch Hausch, Li Li (1993)
A Common Value Model with Endogenous Entry and Information AcquisitionEconomic Theory, 3
-
R. Fullerton, Preston Mcafee (1999)
Auctionin Entry into TournamentsJournal of Political Economy, 107
-
(1991)
Private values auctions with endogenous information: revenue equivalence and non-equivalence -
D. Hausch, Lode Li (1993)
A common value auction model with endogenous entry and information acquisitionEconomic Theory, 3
-
Paul Milgrom (1981)
Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 49
-
Philippe, Jehiel, Benny, Moldovanu (2007)
Strategic Nonparticipation -
Ronald Harstad, M. Rothkopf (2000)
An Alternating Recognition Model of English AuctionsManagement Science, 46
-
S. Athey (1997)
Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete InformationMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
Paul Milgrom, R. Weber (1982)
A theory of auctions and competitive biddingEconometrica, 50
-
Olivier Compte, P. Jehiel (2003)
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: a New Perspective -
J. Crémer, Fahad Khalil (1991)
Gathering Information before Signing a ContractThe American Economic Review, 82
-
G. Tan (1992)
Entry and R & D in procurement contractingJournal of Economic Theory, 58
-
Dan Levin, James Smith (1994)
Equilibrium in Auctions with EntryThe American Economic Review, 84
-
(1996)
Auctions vs. Negotiations -
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2001)
The Effect of Entry and Information Costs on Oral versus Sealed-Bid AuctionsEconomics Letters, 70
-
2 9 They suggest to consider all-pay auctions -
Yeon-Koo Che, Ian Gale (2003)
Optimal Design of Research ContestsThe American Economic Review, 93
-
D. Bergemann, Juuso Valimaki (2000)
Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism DesignMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
E. Rasmusen (2003)
Strategic Implications of Uncertainty over One's Own Private Value in AuctionsAdvances in Theoretical Economics, 6
-
P. Jehiel (2000)
On the virtues of the ascending price auction : New insights in the private value setting
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 2007 RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00072.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The value of an asset is generally not known a priori, and it requires costly investments to be discovered. In such contexts with endogenous information acquisition, which selling procedure generates more revenues? We show that dynamic formats, such as ascending‐price or multistage auctions, perform better than their static counterpart. This is because dynamic formats allow bidders to observe the number of competitors left throughout the selling procedure. Thus, even if competition appears strong ex ante, it may turn out to be weak along the dynamic format, thereby making the option to acquire information valuable. This very possibility also induces the bidders to stay longer in the auction, just to learn about the state of competition. Both effects boost revenues, and our analysis provides a rationale for using dynamic formats rather than sealed‐bid ones.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2007