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Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence

Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence We study auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders. Our model accounts for risk averse bidders' endogenous participation decision and thus encompasses the existing entry models. We establish entry and bidding equilibrium in first‐price auction and ascending auction mechanisms and show that bidders' entry behavior differs between these two mechanisms with different forms of risk aversion. Our approach provides testable implications of risk aversion in terms of entry behavior. We analyze a timber auction data set and propose a simple test for the form of bidders' risk aversion based on our model implications. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders: theory and evidence

The Rand Journal of Economics , Volume 46 (3) – Sep 1, 2015

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References (50)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2015 The RAND Corporation
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12096
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We study auctions with selective entry and risk averse bidders. Our model accounts for risk averse bidders' endogenous participation decision and thus encompasses the existing entry models. We establish entry and bidding equilibrium in first‐price auction and ascending auction mechanisms and show that bidders' entry behavior differs between these two mechanisms with different forms of risk aversion. Our approach provides testable implications of risk aversion in terms of entry behavior. We analyze a timber auction data set and propose a simple test for the form of bidders' risk aversion based on our model implications.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2015

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