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Bank Liquidity Creation, Regulations, and Credit Risk

Bank Liquidity Creation, Regulations, and Credit Risk This study employs bank‐level data covering 3007 individual banks (commercial, savings, and others) in 27 Asian countries to investigate the determinants of bank liquidity creation, considering four conditional factors over the period 1999–2013: credit risk, deposit insurance, financial market regulations, and bank reforms. Bank liquidity creation is shown to be statistically and economically significantly positively related to real economic output, as well as illiquid assets and core deposits. Larger banks increase their liquid assets ratio, but decrease their credit commitment. Countries implementing an explicit deposit insurance scheme may lead to moral hazard and excessive bank risk taking. If supervisory authorities can force a bank to change its internal organizational structure, or have more power to take legal action against external auditors for negligence, or increase capital requirements, then banks generally reduce their lending activities. Nevertheless, larger banks are able to increase liquid assets and lending to those countries with stricter financial regulations. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Wiley

Bank Liquidity Creation, Regulations, and Credit Risk

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2020 Korean Securities Association
ISSN
2041-9945
eISSN
2041-6156
DOI
10.1111/ajfs.12295
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study employs bank‐level data covering 3007 individual banks (commercial, savings, and others) in 27 Asian countries to investigate the determinants of bank liquidity creation, considering four conditional factors over the period 1999–2013: credit risk, deposit insurance, financial market regulations, and bank reforms. Bank liquidity creation is shown to be statistically and economically significantly positively related to real economic output, as well as illiquid assets and core deposits. Larger banks increase their liquid assets ratio, but decrease their credit commitment. Countries implementing an explicit deposit insurance scheme may lead to moral hazard and excessive bank risk taking. If supervisory authorities can force a bank to change its internal organizational structure, or have more power to take legal action against external auditors for negligence, or increase capital requirements, then banks generally reduce their lending activities. Nevertheless, larger banks are able to increase liquid assets and lending to those countries with stricter financial regulations.

Journal

Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies – Wiley

Published: Jun 1, 2020

Keywords: ; ; ; ; ;

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