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Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model

Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model We report results from a laboratory experiment testing the basic hypothesis embedded in various rational voter models that there is a direct correlation between the strength of an individual's belief that his or her vote will be pivotal and the likelihood that individual incurs the cost to vote. This belief is typically unobservable. In one of our experimental treatments we elicit these subjective beliefs using a proper scoring rule that induces truthful revelation of beliefs. This allows us to directly test the pivotal voter model. We find that a higher subjective probability of being pivotal increases the likelihood that an individual votes, but the probability thresholds used by subjects are not as crisp as the theory would predict. There is some evidence that individuals learn over time to adjust their beliefs to be more consistent with the historical frequency of pivotality. However, many subjects keep substantially overestimating their probability of being pivotal. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Beliefs and Voting Decisions: A Test of the Pivotal Voter Model

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©2008, Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00332.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We report results from a laboratory experiment testing the basic hypothesis embedded in various rational voter models that there is a direct correlation between the strength of an individual's belief that his or her vote will be pivotal and the likelihood that individual incurs the cost to vote. This belief is typically unobservable. In one of our experimental treatments we elicit these subjective beliefs using a proper scoring rule that induces truthful revelation of beliefs. This allows us to directly test the pivotal voter model. We find that a higher subjective probability of being pivotal increases the likelihood that an individual votes, but the probability thresholds used by subjects are not as crisp as the theory would predict. There is some evidence that individuals learn over time to adjust their beliefs to be more consistent with the historical frequency of pivotality. However, many subjects keep substantially overestimating their probability of being pivotal.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science – Wiley

Published: Jul 1, 2008

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