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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2011, RAND.
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00130.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Measuring auction revenues under counterfactual reserve prices or formats requires knowledge of distributions of bidders' values and private signals. This poses a challenge when bids are observed from first‐price, common‐value auctions. I bound counterfactual revenue distributions without imposing parametric restrictions on the model structure. Using data from U.S. municipal bond auctions, I find first‐price and second‐price auctions under optimal reserve prices lead to little improvement in revenues over existing first‐price formats. The number of bidders has a more significant impact on revenues in optimal auctions. I also find invoking an incorrect assumption of private values in counterfactual analyses results in small errors in predicting revenues from optimal second‐price auctions.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2011