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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2002 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 1058-6407
- eISSN
- 1530-9134
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00663.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The paper studies the effects of bundling on the bidding strategies and seller revenues in auctions when the bidders have common values for the objects. Bundling of objects before the auction reduces the problem of the winner's curse, and the bidders bid more aggressively. This does not mean that a bundled auction is always better for the seller's revenue. Indeed, there is another effect that makes the bundled auction preferable (from the seller's standpoint) if and only if the number of bidders is small. While this is the only effect present in an independent‐private‐values model, it does not vanish when bidders have pure common values for the objects. The paper concludes that a bundled auction is unambiguously better for the seller than separate auctions when the number of bidders is small.
Journal
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2002