Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade‐off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992–93. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics of Transition and Institutional Change Wiley

Bureaucracies in the Russian Voucher Privatization

Download PDF
21 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/bureaucracies-in-the-russian-voucher-privatization-Dz0PyDyceT

References (1)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
2577-6975
eISSN
2577-6983
DOI
10.1111/1468-0351.00035
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The paper analyses the implementation of voucher privatization in Russia in the framework of incentive theory. The central government needs the support of local privatization agencies. These agencies possess private knowledge concerning: a) their personal reform attitude; b) local privatization conditions. According to the trade‐off between rent extraction and efficiency, the speed of privatization (the efficiency goal) is constrained by the informational rents that the government must pay to local agents. Through voucher privatization, the government learns about local privatization conditions. Surprisingly, this additional information does not necessarily lead to more privatization. In fact, the government may even slow down reforms in order to save on bureaucrats' rents. This result of the model matches with the facts of Russian privatization in the period 1992–93.

Journal

Economics of Transition and Institutional Change – Wiley

Published: Mar 1, 2000

Keywords: ; ; ;

There are no references for this article.