Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(2006)
Executive Compensation and Short-Termist Behavior in Speculative Markets,
M. Narayanan (1995)
Form of Compensation and Managerial Decision HorizonJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31
Adam Brandenburger, Ben Polak (1996)
When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to SeeThe RAND Journal of Economics, 27
J. Stein (1988)
Takeover Threats and Managerial MyopiaJournal of Political Economy, 96
Bengt Holmstrom (1999)
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic PerspectiveThe Review of Economic Studies, 66
L. Bebchuk, Lars Stole (1993)
Do Short‐Term Objectives Lead to Under‐ or Overinvestment in Long‐Term Projects?Journal of Finance, 48
T. Bresnahan, Paul Milgrom, J. Paul (1992)
The Real Output of the Stock Exchange
Observation 6: h (z) changes sign no more than once for z positive
John Bizjak, James Brickley, J. Coles (1993)
Stock-based incentive compensation and investment behaviorJournal of Accounting and Economics, 16
Observations 1, 2 and the continuity of h, there must be a solution to equation (11) which is greater than 0. All that remains is to show that this positive real solution is unique
Ernst-Ludwig Thadden (1995)
Long-Term Contracts, Short-Term Investment and MonitoringThe Review of Economic Studies, 62
John Bizjak, James Brickley, J. Coles (1991)
Stock-Based Incentive Compensation, Asymmetric Information and Investment Behaviour
Bengt Holmström, J. Tirole (1993)
Market Liquidity and Performance MonitoringJournal of Political Economy, 101
A. Edlin, J. Stiglitz (1992)
Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic InefficienciesNBER Working Paper Series
J. Stein (1989)
Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate BehaviorQuarterly Journal of Economics, 104
A. Thakor (1993)
Information, Investment Horizon, and Price ReactionsJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28
I. Jewitt (1988)
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent ProblemsEconometrica, 56
D. Hirshleifer, Tarun Chordia, S. Lim (2001)
Firm and Managerial Incentives to Manipulate the Timing of Project ResolutionEconomics of Innovation eJournal
Edlin Edlin, Stiglitz Stiglitz (1995)
Managerial Rent?Seeking and Economic InefficienciesAmerican Economic Review, 85
Bengt Holmstrom, Paul Milgrom (1987)
AGGREGATION AND LINEARITY IN THE PROVISION OF INTERTEMPORAL INCENTIVESEconometrica, 55
T. Noe, Michael Rebello (1997)
Renegotiation, Investment Horizons, and Managerial DiscretionThe Journal of Business, 70
M. Harris, Bengt Holmstrom (1982)
A Theory of Wage DynamicsThe Review of Economic Studies, 49
(2007)
Innovation and Incentives: Evidence from Corporate R&D,
A. Thakor (1990)
Investment “Myopia” and the Internal Organization of Capital Allocation DecisionsJournal of Law Economics & Organization, 6
M. Jensen (2003)
The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and EvidenceOrganizations & Markets eJournal
Tim Campbell, A. Mariño (1994)
Myopic Investment Decisions and Competitive Labor MarketsInternational Economic Review, 35
Carlos Mello-e-Souza (1993)
Mortal Managers and Long-Term Goals: An Impossibility ResultThe RAND Journal of Economics, 24
J. Paul (1992)
On the Efficiency of Stock-Based CompensationReview of Financial Studies, 5
M. Narayanan (1985)
Managerial Incentives for Short-term ResultsJournal of Finance, 40
R. Banker, S. Datar (1989)
Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance EvaluationJournal of Accounting Research, 27
S. Kole (1997)
The complexity of compensation contractsJournal of Financial Economics, 43
P. Minton, H. Raiffa, Robert Schlaifer (1961)
Applied Statistical Decision Theory.American Mathematical Monthly, 69
Jensen Jensen (1986)
The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and EvidenceMidland Corporate Finance Journal, 4
This paper points out that stock incentives do not lead to myopia unless they result in more emphasis on the short‐term than would occur under an optimal contract. It shows that myopia findings relative to the standard used throughout the literature (first‐best efficiency) are often reversed when evaluated relative to the relevant standard of optimal contracting. Results reported by the previous literature to be myopia often in fact have excessive emphasis on the long‐term. The paper solves in closed‐form for the region in parameter space which gives rise to these reversals and shows that it can be arbitrarily large.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2008
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.