Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/buy-out-prices-in-auctions-seller-competition-and-multi-unit-demands-qhdwJsx9D8
References (33)
-
Jeremy Bulow, John Roberts (1989)
The Simple Economics of Optimal AuctionsJournal of Political Economy, 97
-
M. Bagnoli, Ted Bergstrom (2004)
Log-concave probability and its applicationsEconomic Theory, 26
-
G. Celik, Okan Yilankaya (2005)
Optimal Auctions with Participation Costs -
Xin Wang, A. Montgomery, K. Srinivasan (2008)
When auction meets fixed price: a theoretical and empirical examination of buy-it-now auctionsQuantitative Marketing and Economics, 6
-
(2004)
Inefficiency and Non-linear Pricing in the Optimal Multi-Unit Auction -
Nicholas Shunda (2009)
Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)ERN: Auctions
-
(2006)
Journal of Economic Theory -
E. Maskin, J. Riley, F. Hahn (1989)
Optimal Multi-Unit Auctions -
S. Reynolds, J. Wooders (2004)
Auctions with a buy priceEconomic Theory, 38
-
Jane Black, D. Meza (1992)
Systematic Price Differences Between Successive Auctionsare no AnomalyJournal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1
-
Timothy Mathews (2004)
Buyout Options in Internet Auction Markets -
Nicholas Shunda (2007)
Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependence PreferencesBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, R. Stark (1983)
Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory -
David Reiley (2000)
Auctions on the Internet: What's Being Auctioned, and How?Journal of Industrial Economics, 48
-
(2004)
Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and MultiUnit Demand, draft, University of Aarhus -
Eric Budish, Lisa Takeyama (2001)
Buy prices in online auctions: irrationality on the internet?Economics Letters, 72
-
Jong-Rong Chen, Kong‐Pin Chen, Chien-Fu Chou, Ching-I Huang (2013)
A Dynamic Model of Auctions with Buy‐It‐Now: Theory and EvidenceERN: Other Organizations & Markets: The Firm as a Nexus of Contracts (Boundaries of the Firm) (Topic)
-
Timothy Mathews (2003)
A Risk Averse Seller in a Continuous Time Auction with a Buyout Option, 5
-
R. Weber (1981)
Multiple-Object Auctions -
René Kirkegaard (2005)
Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyersEconomics Letters, 89
-
G. Tan, Okan Yilankaya (2005)
Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation CostsMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
R. Myerson (1981)
Optimal Auction DesignMath. Oper. Res., 6
-
René Kirkegaard, P. Overgaard (2003)
Buy-Out Prices in Online Auctions: Multi-Unit DemandIO: Productivity
-
P. Février, William Roos, M. Visser (2005)
The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at DrouotJournal of Economics and Management Strategy, 14
-
P. Klemperer (1999)
Auction Theory: A Guide to the LiteratureMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
Brett Katzman (1999)
A Two Stage Sequential Auction with Multi-Unit Demands☆☆☆Journal of Economic Theory, 86
-
Jeremy Bulow, P. Klemperer (1996)
Auctions versus NegotiationsThe American Economic Review, 86
-
F. Hahn (1990)
The Economics of missing markets, information, and gamesThe Economic Journal, 100
-
Timothy Mathews, Brett Katzman (2006)
The role of varying risk attitudes in an auction with a buyout optionEconomic Theory, 27
-
René Kirkegaard, P. Overgaard (2005)
Pre-Auction Offers in Asymmetric First-Price and Second-Price Auctions -
Timothy Mathews (2004)
The Impact of Discounting on an Auction with a Buyout Option: a Theoretical Analysis Motivated by eBay’s Buy-It-Now FeatureJournal of Economics, 81
-
Tan Tan, Yilankaya Yilankaya (2006)
Equilibria in Second Price Auctions with Participation CostsJournal of Economic Theory, 130
-
Z. Hidvégi, Wenli Wang, Andrew Whinston (2006)
Buy-price English auctionJ. Econ. Theory, 129
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2008, RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00038.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2008