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Competition and subsidies in the deregulated US local telephone industry

Competition and subsidies in the deregulated US local telephone industry The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic US local telephone industry to new entrants. However, substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive. We study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry. We estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants, allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting. We find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets, but subsidies to only lower‐cost firms are less cost effective than a nondiscriminatory policy. Subsidies in only early periods reduce the option value of waiting and accelerate the arrival of competition. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Competition and subsidies in the deregulated US local telephone industry

The Rand Journal of Economics , Volume 46 (4) – Oct 1, 2015

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References (56)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2015 The RAND Corporation
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12109
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The 1996 Telecommunications Act opened the monopolistic US local telephone industry to new entrants. However, substantial entry costs have prevented some markets from becoming competitive. We study various subsidy policies designed to encourage entry. We estimate a dynamic entry game using data on potential and actual entrants, allowing for heterogeneous option values of waiting. We find that subsidies to smaller markets are more cost effective in reducing monopoly markets, but subsidies to only lower‐cost firms are less cost effective than a nondiscriminatory policy. Subsidies in only early periods reduce the option value of waiting and accelerate the arrival of competition.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Oct 1, 2015

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