Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/competitive-foreclosure-plot3U0mB6
References (43)
-
Roberto Burguet, J. Sákovics (2017)
Bertrand and the long runInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 51
-
R. McAfee (1993)
Mechanism Design by Competing SellersEconometrica, 61
-
L. Pepall, Daniel Richards (2001)
Reach for the Stars: A Strategic Bidding GameEconomica, 68
-
Jonathan Thomas (2015)
Inter-league competition for talent vs . competitive balance -
Tom Lee, Louis Wilde (1980)
Market Structure and Innovation: A ReformulationQuarterly Journal of Economics, 94
-
P. Rey, J. Tirole (2007)
A Primer on ForeclosureHandbook of Industrial Organization, 3
-
L. Marx, G. Shaffer (2008)
Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream marketsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 38
-
F. Palomino, J. Sákovics (2004)
Inter-league competition for talent vs. competitive balanceInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 22
-
Jennifer Reinganum (1989)
The timing of innovation: Research, development, and diffusionHandbook of Industrial Organization, 1
-
Alison Booth (2014)
Wage Determination and Imperfect CompetitionIO: Empirical Studies of Firms & Markets eJournal
-
K. Lang, R. Rosenthal (1991)
The Contractors' GameThe RAND Journal of Economics, 22
-
O. Blanchard, F. Giavazzi (2000)
Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labor MarketsMacroeconomics eJournal
-
Jeremy Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, P. Klemperer (1985)
Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and ComplementsJournal of Political Economy, 93
-
L. Kaas, P. Madden (2004)
A new model of equilibrium involuntary unemploymentEconomic Theory, 23
-
P. Rey, J. Tirole (2007)
The Handbook of Industrial Organization -
Michael Peters, S. Severinov (1997)
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of PricesJournal of Economic Theory, 75
-
Péter Eso, Volker Nocke, L. White (2010)
Competition for scarce resourcesThe RAND Journal of Economics, 41
-
G. Mailath, L. Samuelson, A. Shaked (2000)
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided SearchThe American Economic Review, 90
-
Roberto Burguet, J. Sákovics (1999)
Imperfect Competition in Auction DesignsInternational Economic Review, 40
-
M. Yanelle (1997)
Banking Competition and Market EfficiencyThe Review of Economic Studies, 64
-
L. Marx, G. Shaffer (2016)
Cournot Competition with a Common Input Supplier -
Samiran Banerjee, P. Lin (2003)
Downstream R&D, Raising Rivals' Costs, and Input Price ContractsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 21
-
Yongmin Chen, D. Sappington (2011)
Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and WelfareAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3
-
B. Julien, J. Kennes, Ian King (2000)
Bidding for LaborReview of Economic Dynamics, 3
-
M. Salinger (1988)
Vertical Mergers and Market ForeclosureQuarterly Journal of Economics, 103
-
D. Stahl (1988)
Bertrand Competition for Inputs and Walrasian OutcomesThe American Economic Review, 78
-
Blanchard (2003)
Macroeconomic Effects or Regulation and De-regulation in Goods and Labor MarketsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 118
-
K. Dastidar (1995)
On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibriumEconomic Theory, 5
-
Daniel Spulber (1996)
Market Making by Price-Setting FirmsThe Review of Economic Studies, 63
-
Janet Yellen (1995)
Efficiency Wage Models of UnemploymentThe American Economic Review, 74
-
Gianni Fraja, J. Sákovics (2001)
Walras Retrouvé: Decentralized Trading Mechanisms and the Competitive PriceJournal of Political Economy, 109
-
C. Stefanadis (1997)
Downstream Vertical Foreclosure and Upstream InnovationJournal of Industrial Economics, 45
-
Booth (2014)
Wage Determination and Imperfect CompetitionLabour Economics, 30
-
V. Bhaskar, A. Manning, T. To (2002)
Oligopsony and monopsonistic competition in labor marketsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 16
-
G. Loury (1979)
Market Structure and InnovationQuarterly Journal of Economics, 93
-
Oz Shy, Rune Stenbacka (2015)
Talent Competition, Labor Mobility, and Anti-Poaching Agreements∗ -
E. Koskela, Rune Stenbacka (2012)
The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharingLabour Economics, 19
-
Joaquim Silvestre (1991)
The Market-Power Foundations of Macroeconomic PolicyJournal of Economic Literature, 31
-
A. Dixit (1978)
A MODEL OF DUOPOLY SUGGESTING A THEORY OF ENTRY BARRIERSThe Bell Journal of Economics, 10
-
P. Jehiel, B. Moldovanu (2000)
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among BuyersThe RAND Journal of Economics, 31
-
P. Rey, M. Whinston (2013)
Does Retailer Power Lead to ExclusionThe RAND Journal of Economics, 44
-
Jeanine Miklós-Thal, P. Rey, T. Vergé (2011)
Buyer Power and Intrabrand CoordinationJournal of the European Economic Association, 9
-
J. Mayo, D. Sappington (2016)
When do auctions ensure the welfare‐maximizing allocation of scarce inputs?The RAND Journal of Economics, 47
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12206
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We model oligopolistic firms, producing substitutes, who compete for inputs from capacity constrained suppliers in a decentralized market. Compared to a price‐taking input market, the incentive to foreclose downstream competitors leads to higher input prices and to a higher aggregate amount of input acquired. This novel feature mitigates the output reducing effect of downstream market power and may even restore efficiency in the unique (input) market clearing equilibrium. Other equilibria, where firms coordinate on which suppliers to target, result in excess supply (involuntary unemployment, if input is labor) and even higher input prices. Our insights generalize to alternative vertical structures.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2017