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Competitive intelligence and disclosure

Competitive intelligence and disclosure Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

Competitive intelligence and disclosure

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References (37)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2015 The RAND Corporation
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12103
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Competitive intelligence (CI) activities open new opportunities for firms to acquire and disclose information. We show that disclosure depends on the relative usefulness of information to the competing firms and is generally less (more) likely with Cournot (Bertrand) competition and when firms adopt product differentiation strategies. When CI costs are independent of information characteristics, each firm seeks information solely useful to itself and discloses it unless it is a Bertrand competitor with customer information. Only when the cost advantage is sufficiently great does each firm seek information useful to itself and its rival.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Oct 1, 2015

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