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Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory

Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory INTRODUCTIONAdvocates of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) argue that Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) is inadequate because it gives the wrong result in Newcomb problems. Egan (2007) provides a recipe for converting Newcomb problems to counterexamples to CDT, arguing that CDT is inadequate too. Egan's argument led to the formulation of several new decision theories designed to conform to the supposedly correct pre‐theoretic judgments about the rationality of acts in Newcomb problems and Egan cases. Two major theories that proposed with this aim in mind are the Conditional Causal Decision Theory (CCDT) (as I call it), proposed by Edgington (2011), and the Benchmark Theory, proposed by Wedgwood (2013).While the Benchmark Theory has been criticized, I assume, successfully by Briggs (2010) and Bassett (2015), CCDT has been widely taken uncritically as a version of CDT that conforms to the assumed pre‐theoretic judgments about the rationality of acts in Newcomb problems and in Egan's cases: see Ahmed (2012, p. 386), Pittard (2016, p. 20) and Williamson (2019, p. 7).After a brief introduction of CCDT (in section 2), I argue (in section 3) that, despite Edgington's promise, CCDT gives the wrong result in Newcomb problems. This, I assume, shows that CCDT is superior neither to the classic visions of CDT nor to EDT. Then http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Analytic Philosophy Wiley

Conditional causal decision theory reduces to evidential decision theory

Mohajeri, Mostafa
Analytic Philosophy , Volume Early View – Mar 8, 2023
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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2023 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
ISSN
2153-9596
eISSN
2153-960X
DOI
10.1111/phib.12298
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Abstract

INTRODUCTIONAdvocates of Causal Decision Theory (CDT) argue that Evidential Decision Theory (EDT) is inadequate because it gives the wrong result in Newcomb problems. Egan (2007) provides a recipe for converting Newcomb problems to counterexamples to CDT, arguing that CDT is inadequate too. Egan's argument led to the formulation of several new decision theories designed to conform to the supposedly correct pre‐theoretic judgments about the rationality of acts in Newcomb problems and Egan cases. Two major theories that proposed with this aim in mind are the Conditional Causal Decision Theory (CCDT) (as I call it), proposed by Edgington (2011), and the Benchmark Theory, proposed by Wedgwood (2013).While the Benchmark Theory has been criticized, I assume, successfully by Briggs (2010) and Bassett (2015), CCDT has been widely taken uncritically as a version of CDT that conforms to the assumed pre‐theoretic judgments about the rationality of acts in Newcomb problems and in Egan's cases: see Ahmed (2012, p. 386), Pittard (2016, p. 20) and Williamson (2019, p. 7).After a brief introduction of CCDT (in section 2), I argue (in section 3) that, despite Edgington's promise, CCDT gives the wrong result in Newcomb problems. This, I assume, shows that CCDT is superior neither to the classic visions of CDT nor to EDT. Then

Journal

Analytic Philosophy – Wiley

Published: Mar 8, 2023

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