Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/contract-choice-efficiency-and-fairness-in-revenue-sharing-contracts-X8D4RKZdjO
References (39)
-
E. Fehr, Klaus Schmidt (2004)
Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent ModelBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
Canice Prendergast (2008)
Intrinsic Motivation and IncentivesThe American Economic Review, 98
-
Lucy Ackert, J. Martínez-Vázquez, M. Rider (2007)
Social Preferences and Tax Policy Design: Some Experimental EvidencePublic Economics: Taxation
-
B. Greiner (2004)
The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics -
M. Bacharach, G. Guerra, D. Zizzo (2007)
The Self-Fulfilling Property of Trust: An Experimental StudyTheory and Decision, 63
-
(2011)
An Experimental Study, Theory and Decision -
E. Fehr, Klaus Schmidt (1999)
Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual ChoicesBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
E. Fehr, B. Rockenbach (2003)
Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruismNature, 422
-
W. Güth, Peter Ockenfels, Markus Wendel (1993)
Efficiency by trust in fairness? multiperiod ultimatum bargaining experiments with an increasing cakeInternational Journal of Game Theory, 22
-
D. Allen, D. Lueck (1992)
Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus CropshareThe Journal of Law and Economics, 35
-
W. Güth, R. Schmittberger, Bernd Schwarze (1982)
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargainingJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 3
-
M. Villata (2017)
Why Did You Do that -
Jr. Dana, K. Spier (2003)
REVENUE SHARING AND VERTICAL CONTROL IN THE VIDEO RENTAL INDUSTRYJournal of Industrial Economics, 49
-
A. Falk, M. Kosfeld (2006)
The hidden costs of controlThe American Economic Review, 96
-
(2011)
Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements? -
U. Fischbacher (2007)
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 10
-
V. Anderhub, S. Gächter, M. Königstein (2001)
Efficient Contracting and Fair Play in a Simple Principal-Agent ExperimentBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
Kenneth Chan (2006)
Trust Games, the Moral of the StoryBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
E. Fehr (1998)
A Theory of Fairness, Competition and CooperationBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
John Bone, J. Hey, J. Suckling (2004)
A Simple Risk-Sharing ExperimentJournal of Risk and Uncertainty, 28
-
R. Greenwood, L. Empson (2003)
The Professional Partnership: Relic or Exemplary Form of Governance?Organization Studies, 24
-
Amadou Boly (2011)
On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the fieldExperimental Economics, 14
-
H. James (2005)
Why Did You Do That? An Economic Examination of the Effect of Extrinsic Compensation on Intrinsic Motivation and PerformanceJournal of Economic Psychology, 26
-
E. Fehr, Alexander Klein, Klaus Schmidt (2007)
Fairness and contract designEconometrica, 75
-
Kevin Murdock (2002)
Intrinsic Motivation and Optimal Incentive ContractsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 33
-
A. Danilov, Dirk Sliwka (2017)
Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental EvidenceExperimental Studies eJournal
-
Stefan Szymanski, S. Késenne (2004)
Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team SportsIO: Theory
-
(2002)
estimated the parameters to take the following values: ρρ = 0.424 -
A. Bruyn, Gary Bolton (2008)
Estimating the Influence of Fairness on Bargaining BehaviorManag. Sci., 54
-
(2007)
Simple Principal–Agent Experiment, Experimental Economics -
B. Frey (1998)
Economics, Values, and Organization -
G. Charness, M. Rabin (2001)
UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL PREFERENCES WITH SIMPLE TESTS -
Robin Cubitt, C. Starmer, R. Sugden (1998)
On the Validity of the Random Lottery Incentive SystemExperimental Economics, 1
-
B. Frey (1998)
Economics, values, and organization: Institutions and morale: the crowding-out effect -
First version submitted -
E. Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer, Klaus Schmidt (2005)
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership RightsBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans-Theo Normann (2010)
A Within-Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding PreferencesBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
E. Fehr, S. Kremhelmer, K. M. Schmidt (2008)
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Property Rights, 118
-
(2008)
Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort ?
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12200
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We present a simple principal–agent experiment in which the principals are allowed to choose between a revenue‐sharing, a bonus, and a trust contract, to offer to an agent. Our findings suggest that a large majority of experimental subjects choose the revenue‐sharing contract. This choice turns out to be not only the most efficient but also, at the same time, fair. Overall, the distribution of earnings is only mildly skewed towards the principal. We conclude that, under revenue‐sharing contracts, concerns for fairness can be closely associated with the use of monetary incentives.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2017
Keywords: ; ; ; ; ; ; ;