Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Contracts with Wishful Thinkers

Contracts with Wishful Thinkers In a setting with a wishful thinking agent and a realistic principal, the paper studies how incentive contracts should be designed to control for both moral hazard and self‐deception. The properties of the contract that reconcile the agent with reality depend on the weight the agent attaches to anticipatory utility. When this is small, principal and agent agree on full recollection. For intermediate values the principal bears an extra cost to make the agent recall bad news. For large weights, the principal gives up on inducing signal recollection. We also extend the analysis to the case in which the parameter of anticipatory utility is private information. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Wiley

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/contracts-with-wishful-thinkers-0ZruQny5ia

References (61)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ISSN
1058-6407
eISSN
1530-9134
DOI
10.1111/jems.12113
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In a setting with a wishful thinking agent and a realistic principal, the paper studies how incentive contracts should be designed to control for both moral hazard and self‐deception. The properties of the contract that reconcile the agent with reality depend on the weight the agent attaches to anticipatory utility. When this is small, principal and agent agree on full recollection. For intermediate values the principal bears an extra cost to make the agent recall bad news. For large weights, the principal gives up on inducing signal recollection. We also extend the analysis to the case in which the parameter of anticipatory utility is private information.

Journal

Journal of Economics & Management StrategyWiley

Published: Oct 1, 2015

There are no references for this article.