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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12245
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström were awarded the 2016 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their path‐breaking work.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jul 1, 2017
Keywords: ; ; ; ; ; ; ;