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Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court

Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the... We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside vacancy periods. We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those same times. The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence such behavior. These findings provide empirical support for the argument that federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences, and provide new avenues for research into judges' goals and the role of audiences in judicial decision making. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Courting the President: How Circuit Court Judges Alter Their Behavior for Promotion to the Supreme Court

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©2016 by the Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12132
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine whether circuit court judges sacrifice policy purity for career goals. We compare the behavior of contender judges–those most likely to be elevated to the Supreme Court–during vacancy periods with their behavior outside vacancy periods. We also examine the behavior of noncontender judges during those same times. The data show that during vacancy periods, contender judges are more likely to vote consistently with the president's preferences, to rule in favor of the United States, and to write dissenting opinions. Noncontender judges fail to evidence such behavior. These findings provide empirical support for the argument that federal judges adapt their behavior to specific audiences, and provide new avenues for research into judges' goals and the role of audiences in judicial decision making.

Journal

American Journal of Political ScienceWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2016

References