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Damaged durable goods

Damaged durable goods I analyze a durable‐goods monopolist's incentives to introduce a damaged good (a stripped‐down version of the original good) in an infinite‐horizon framework. The damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the Coasian time‐inconsistency problem. However, it may lead to a welfare reduction: low‐valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low‐quality damaged good early rather than buy the high‐quality original good later, and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions. This welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

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References (33)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2006 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00007.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

I analyze a durable‐goods monopolist's incentives to introduce a damaged good (a stripped‐down version of the original good) in an infinite‐horizon framework. The damaged good helps the monopolist to mitigate the Coasian time‐inconsistency problem. However, it may lead to a welfare reduction: low‐valuation buyers are induced to purchase the low‐quality damaged good early rather than buy the high‐quality original good later, and when the players are patient the surplus loss from quality reduction outweighs the gain from earlier consumptions. This welfare result contrasts with the previous literature based on a static framework.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2006

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