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Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda

Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations?... We offer a framework for analyzing the impact of monitoring—a commonly recommended solution to poor leadership—on the quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations in low‐income countries. In our model, groups may face a trade‐off between leader ability and effort. If the group's ability to monitor the leader is low, then the leader may exert too little effort. A higher level of monitoring increases leader effort, raising the value of the public good. However, more intense monitoring may also drive higher‐ability members to opt out of candidacy, reducing public‐goods value. The result is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. The trade‐off between leader effort and ability, however, only exists in the presence of sufficient private‐income opportunities. These predictions are assessed using original data gathered from Ugandan farmer associations. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Do Better Monitoring Institutions Increase Leadership Quality in Community Organizations? Evidence from Uganda

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
©2014 by the Midwest Political Science Association
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/ajps.12071
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We offer a framework for analyzing the impact of monitoring—a commonly recommended solution to poor leadership—on the quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations in low‐income countries. In our model, groups may face a trade‐off between leader ability and effort. If the group's ability to monitor the leader is low, then the leader may exert too little effort. A higher level of monitoring increases leader effort, raising the value of the public good. However, more intense monitoring may also drive higher‐ability members to opt out of candidacy, reducing public‐goods value. The result is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between the level of monitoring and the value of the public good. The trade‐off between leader effort and ability, however, only exists in the presence of sufficient private‐income opportunities. These predictions are assessed using original data gathered from Ugandan farmer associations.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science – Wiley

Published: Jul 1, 2014

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