Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/does-multimarket-contact-facilitate-tacit-collusion-inference-on-86fQy0zn1E
References (59)
-
A. Salvo (2010)
Inferring Market Power under the Threat of Entry: The Case of the Brazilian Cement Industry, 41
-
T. Bresnahan (1987)
Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Oligopoly: The 1955 Price WarJournal of Law and Economics, 35
-
S. Berry (1994)
Estimating Discrete?Choice Models of Product DifferentiationAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 25
-
L. White (2001)
Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?, 18
-
P. Bajari, J. Fox, S. Ryan (2007)
Linear Regression Estimation of Discrete Choice Models with Nonparametric Distributions of Random CoefficientsAmerican Economic Review P&P, 97
-
S. Berry, M. Carnall, P. Spiller (2006)
Advances in Airline Economics, Competition Policy and AntitrustEconometrica, I
-
S. Berry (1992)
Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline IndustryRAND Journal of Economics, 60
-
J. Brander, A. Zhang (1993)
Dynamic Oligopoly Behaviour in the Airline IndustryJournal of Law and Economics, 11
-
T. Bresnahan (1981)
Departures from Marginal?Cost Pricing in the American Automobile IndustryJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 17
-
P. Parker, L.‐H. Roller (1997)
Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross?Ownership in the Mobile Telephone IndustryReview of Industrial Organization, 28
-
(1989)
Barriers to Competition in the Airline Industry -
K.S. Corts (1999)
Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market PowerEconometrica, 88
-
N. Fernandez, P. Marin (1998)
Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel IndustryEconomic Letters, 46
-
Bajari (2011)
381Quantitative Economics, 2
-
Baker (1988)
283International Journal of Industrial Organization, 6
-
R. Porter (1983)
A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880?1886, 14
-
O. Ashenfelter, D. Sullivan (1987)
Nonparametric Tests of Market Structure: An Application to the Cigarette IndustryJournal of Industrial Economics, 35
-
K. Hendricks, R. Porter (1989)
Collusion in AuctionsBell Journal of Economics, 15/16
-
J. Waldfogel, J. Wulf (2006)
Measuring the Effect of Multimarket Contact on Competition: Evidence from Mergers Following Radio Broadcast Ownership Deregulation, 5
-
Bajari (2007)
459American Economic Review P&P, 97
-
F. Ciliberto, J. Williams (2010)
Limited Access to Airport Facilities and Market Power in the Airline IndustryJournal of Economics & Management Strategy, 53
-
J. Harrington (2008)
Handbook in Antitrust EconomicsRAND Journal of Economics
-
V. Singal (1996)
Airline Mergers and Multimarket Contact, 17
-
S. Berry, P. Jia (2010)
Tracing the Woes: An Empirical Analysis of the Airline IndustryRAND Journal of Economics, 2
-
J. Brander, A. Zhang (1990)
Market Conduct in the Airline Industry: An Empirical InvestigationRAND Journal of Economics, 21
-
Armantier (2008)
875RAND Journal of Economics, 39
-
A. Nevo (2001)
Measuring Market Power in the Ready?to?Eat Cereal IndustryRand Journal of Economics, 69
-
J. Baker, T. Bresnahan (1988)
Estimating the Residual Demand Curve Facing a Single FirmInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 6
-
P. Goldberg (1995)
Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in International Markets: The Case of the U.S. Automobile IndustryEconometrica, 63
-
F. Gasmi, J.‐J. Laffont, Q. Vuong (1992)
Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in a Soft?drink MarketEconomics Letters, 1
-
I. Jans, D. Rosenbaum (1997)
Multimarket Contact and Pricing: Evidence from the U.S. Cement IndustryJournal of Law and Economics, 15
-
T. Bresnahan (1982)
The Oligopoly Solution Concept is IdentifiedEconometrica, 10
-
I. Hendel, A. Nevo (2006)
Measuring the Implications of Sales and Consumer Inventory BehaviorJournal of Law and Economics, 74
-
(1990)
Airline Competition: Industry Operating and Marketing Practices Limit Market Entry -
D.B. Bernheim, M.D. Whinston (1990)
Multimarket Contact and Collusive BehaviorAmerican Economic Review P&P, 21
-
F. Verboven (1996)
International Price Discrimination in the European Car Market, 27
-
C. Edwards (1955)
Business Concentration and Price PolicyEconometrica
-
P. Reiss, P. Spiller (1989)
Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets, 32
-
S. Berry (1990)
Airport Presence as Product DifferentiationEconometrica, 80
-
M. Busse (2000)
Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone IndustryThe Journal of Business, 9
-
F. Ciliberto, E. Tamer (2009)
Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in the Airline IndustryRAND Journal of Economics, 77
-
S. Berry, J. Levinsohn, A. Pakes (1995)
Automobile Prices in Market EquilibriumInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 63
-
J. Brueckner, P. Spiller (1994)
Economies of Traffic Density in the Deregulated Airline IndustryQuarterly Journal of Economics, 37
-
J. Rosse (1970)
Estimating Cost Function Parameters without Using Cost Data: Illustrated Methodology, 38
-
R. Porter (2005)
Detecting Collusion, 26
-
P. Bajari, J. Fox, K. Kim, S. Ryan (2011)
A Simple Estimator for the Distribution of Random CoefficientsQuantitative Economics, 2
-
Ashenfelter (1987)
483Journal of Industrial Economics, 35
-
A. Jacquemin, M. Slade (1989)
Handbook of Industrial OrganizationReview of Industrial Organization, II
-
J. Brueckner, N. Dyer, P. Spiller (1992)
Fare Determination in Airline Hub?and?Spoke NetworksJournal of Econometrics, 23
-
C. Fershtman, A. Pakes (2000)
A Dynamic Oligopoly with Collusion and Price WarsJournal of Law and Economics, 31
-
S. Borenstein (1989)
Hubs and High Fares: Dominance and Market Power in the U.S. Airline IndustryEconomic Letters, 20
-
W. Evans, I. Kessides (1994)
Living by the Golden Rule': Multimarket Contact in the U.S. Airline IndustryAnnales d'Economie et de Statistique, 109
-
C. Peters (2006)
Evaluating the Performance of Merger Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 49
-
R. Feinberg (1985)
?Sales at Risk': A Test of the Mutual Forbearance Theory of Conglomerate BehaviorInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 58
-
J. Panzar, J. Rosse (1987)
Testing for ?Monopoly? EquilibriumContributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, 35
-
L. Lau (1982)
On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output DataEconometrica, 10
-
O. Armantier, O. Richard (2008)
Domestic Airline Alliances and Consumer WelfareRAND Journal of Economics, 39
-
A. Miller (2010)
Did the Airline Tariff Publishing Case Reduce Collusion?RAND Journal of Economics, 53
-
A. Nevo (1998)
Identification of the Oligopoly Solution Concept in a Differentiated?Product IndustryManagerial and Decision Economics, 59
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2014 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12070
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We provide empirical evidence that multimarket contact facilitates tacit collusion among airlines using a flexible model of oligopolistic behavior, where conduct parameters are modelled as functions of multimarket contact. We find (i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, whereas carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; (ii) cross‐price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on equilibrium fares; (iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; (iv) assuming firms behave as Bertrand‐Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2014