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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2011, RAND.
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00132.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We develop a dynamic regulation model of quality provision where maintenance efforts and quality shocks have a durable impact. When the regulator contracts with a sequence of agents, asymmetric information can lead to overprovision of quality, reflecting a dynamic rent extraction effect. When the regulator contracts with a single agent, the efficiency of their relationship depends on the regulator’s ability to transfer rents across periods. Hiring a single agent with unlimited liability is socially preferable to hiring a sequence of agents, even when no commitment is feasible. By contrast, shorter franchises are socially preferable if the agent has limited liability.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2011