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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2008, RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2008.00045.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In many countries, pharmacies receive high regulated markups and are protected from competition through geographic entry restrictions. We develop an empirical entry model for pharmacies and physicians with two features: entry restrictions and strategic complementarities. We find that the entry restrictions have directly reduced the number of pharmacies by more than 50%, and also indirectly reduced the number of physicians by about 7%. A removal of the entry restrictions, combined with a reduction in the regulated markups, would generate a large shift in rents to consumers, without reducing the availability of pharmacies. The public interest motivation for the current regime therefore has no empirical support.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2008