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Exclusive content in two‐sided markets

Exclusive content in two‐sided markets This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two‐sided markets in which both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two‐sided platform market with a monopolistic multiproduct firm (content provider) on one side and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by the increase in multihoming consumers and the negative effect caused by the restriction of distribution channels. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Wiley

Exclusive content in two‐sided markets

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References (22)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2021 Wiley Periodicals LLC
ISSN
1058-6407
eISSN
1530-9134
DOI
10.1111/jems.12427
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study investigates the role of exclusive content provision in two‐sided markets in which both sides are allowed to join multiple platforms. We consider a model of duopolistic two‐sided platform market with a monopolistic multiproduct firm (content provider) on one side and consumers on the other. The model demonstrates that the monopolistic content provider uses exclusivity as strategic commitment to balance two opposite effects on its bargaining power: the positive effect caused by the increase in multihoming consumers and the negative effect caused by the restriction of distribution channels.

Journal

Journal of Economics & Management StrategyWiley

Published: Aug 1, 2021

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