Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Family Altruism and Incentives

Family Altruism and Incentives This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Scandinavian Journal of Economics Wiley

Family Altruism and Incentives

The Scandinavian Journal of Economics , Volume 107 (1) – Mar 1, 2005

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/family-altruism-and-incentives-YRLHW0aV0D

References (29)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0347-0520
eISSN
1467-9442
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00395.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding.

Journal

The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Mar 1, 2005

There are no references for this article.