Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/fines-leniency-and-rewards-in-antitrust-EDB1FCluNK
References (61)
-
D. Quervain, U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, Melanie Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, A. Buck, E. Fehr (2004)
The Neural Basis of Altruistic PunishmentScience, 305
-
C. Holt (1995)
5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research -
V. Crawford, Bruno Broseta (1997)
What Price Coordination? The Efficiency-Enhancing Effect of Auctioning the Right to PlayThe American Economic Review, 88
-
BÓ Pedrodal (2005)
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future : Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games -
Mikel Janitz (2006)
What doesn't kill us makes us strongerControl Engineering, 53
-
O. Andersson, E. Wengström (2007)
Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in DuopoliesMicroeconomic Theory eJournal
-
Archishman Chakraborty, Nandini Gupta, Rick Harbaugh (2004)
Best Foot Forward or Best for Last in a Sequential Auction?Microeconomic Theory eJournal
-
Andersson (2007)
Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in DuopoliesScandinavian Journal of Economics, 109
-
Yasuyo Hamaguchi, Toshiji Kawagoe, A. Shibata (2009)
Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 27
-
Barbara McCutcheon (1997)
Do Meetings in Smoke‐Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?Journal of Political Economy, 105
-
J. Hinloopen, S. Onderstal (2014)
Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctionsEuropean Economic Review, 70
-
U. Fischbacher (2007)
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experimentsExperimental Economics, 10
-
Daniel Meisel (2000)
Blowing the whistleThe Lancet, 356
-
T. Offerman, J. Potters (2006)
Does auctioning of entry licenses induce collusion? An experimental studyJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
-
J. Harrington, Myong-Hun Chang (2009)
Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition PolicyJournal of the European Economic Association, 7
-
E. Fehr, S. Gächter (1999)
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods ExperimentsBehavioral & Experimental Economics
-
Joseph Harrington (2006)
Modelling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Antitrust Policy -
M. Dufwenberg, G. Spagnolo (2012)
Legalizing Bribe GivingMacroeconomics: National Income & Product Accounts eJournal
-
O. Andersson, H. Holm (2010)
Endogenous Communication and Tacit Coordination in Market Entry Games - An explorative experimental studyInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 28
-
L. Corrado (2005)
Generalized Latent Variable Modeling: Multilevel, Longitudinal, and Structural Equation ModelsJournal of the American Statistical Association, 100
-
V. Crawford (1998)
A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap TalkJournal of Economic Theory, 78
-
Steffen Brenner (2009)
An empirical study of the European corporate leniency programInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 27
-
M. Bigoni, S. Fridolfsson, C. Coq, G. Spagnolo (2014)
Trust, Leniency and DeterrenceLSN: Causes & Consequences of Crime (Sub-Topic)
-
Jana Krajčová, A. Ortmann (2008)
Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of 'Natural' Framing -
Jose Apesteguia, M. Dufwenberg, R. Selten (2003)
Blowing the WhistleEconomic Theory, 31
-
Anna Dreber, David Rand, D. Fudenberg, M. Nowak (2008)
Winners don’t punishNature, 452
-
P. Bó, Guillaume Fréchette (2011)
The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental EvidenceThe American Economic Review, 101
-
Paolo Buccirossi (2008)
Handbook of Antitrust Economics, 1
-
Joseph Jr, Roberto González, P. Kujal (2014)
The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental FindingsERN: Other Microeconomics: Production
-
Nathan Miller (2009)
Strategic Leniency and Cartel EnforcementThe American Economic Review, 99
-
Robert Rogers (2004)
Competition Policy: Theory and PracticeReview of Political Economy, 23
-
David Kreps, K. Wallis (1997)
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications -
Cécile Aubert, P. Rey, William Kovacic (2006)
The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartelsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 24
-
Offerman Offerman, Potters Potters (2006)
Does Auctioning of Entry Licenses Induce Collusion? An Experimental StudyReview of Economic Studies, 73
-
A. Skrondal, S. Rabe-Hesketh (2004)
Generalized latent variable models: multilevel, longitudinal, and structural equation models -
S. Fridolfsson, M. Bigoni, C. Coq, G. Spagnolo (2009)
Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: An ExperimentIO: Regulation
-
P. Bó (2005)
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated GamesThe American Economic Review, 95
-
S. Lipovetsky (2005)
Generalized Latent Variable Modeling: Multilevel,Longitudinal, and Structural Equation ModelsTechnometrics, 47
-
Jana Krajčová (2008)
Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of Change in ParameterizationGames & Political Behavior eJournal
-
Peter Dijkstra (2014)
Price leadership and unequal market sharing: collusion in experimental marketsInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 43
-
J. Hinloopen, A. Soetevent (2008)
Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 39
-
D. Cooper, Kai-Uwe Kuhn (2009)
Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for CollusionGame Theory & Bargaining Theory eJournal
-
Michele Polo, Massimo Motta (1999)
Leniency Programs and Cartel ProsecutionLaw & Economics
-
Fehr Fehr, Gächter Gächter (2000)
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods ExperimentsAmerican Economic Review, 90
-
G. Spagnolo (2006)
Leniency and Whistleblowers in AntitrustCEPR Discussion Paper Series
-
J. Harrington (2008)
Optimal Corporate Leniency ProgramsIO: Regulation
-
E. Fehr, S. Gächter (2002)
Altruistic punishment in humansNature, 415
-
C. Engel (2007)
Tacit Collusion: The Neglected Experimental EvidenceLaw & Economics eJournal
-
L. Putterman (2010)
Cooperation and PunishmentScience, 328
-
Michael Sproul (1993)
Antitrust and PricesJournal of Political Economy, 101
-
M. Whinston (2006)
Lectures on Antitrust Economics -
Gérard Cachon, Colin Camerer (1996)
Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination GamesQuarterly Journal of Economics, 111
-
Motta Motta, Polo Polo (2003)
Leniency Programs and Cartel ProsecutionInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 21
-
Yasuyo Hamaguchi, Toshiko Ishikawa, Masayuki Ishimoto, Yuji Kimura, Tadanobu Tanno (2007)
An experimental study of procurement auctions with leniency programs -
C. Ellis, W. Wilson (2001)
What Doesn’t Kill us Makes us Stronger: An Analysis of Corporate Leniency Policy -
(2000)
Self-Defeating Antitrust Laws Working Paper no -
J. Hinloopen, S. Onderstal (2010)
Collusion and the Choice of Auction: An Experimental StudyIO: Theory eJournal
-
G. Spagnolo (2004)
Divide Et Impera: Optimal Leniency ProgramsCriminal Law & Procedure eJournal
-
J. Huyck, R. Battalio, Richard Beil (1993)
Asset Markets as an Equilibrium Selection Mechanism: Coordination Failure, Game Form Auctions, and Tacit CommunicationGames and Economic Behavior, 5
-
P. Rey (2002)
Towards a Theory of Competition Policy -
Harrington Harrington (2008)
Optimal Corporate Leniency ProgramsJournal of Industrial Economics, 56
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2012, RAND.
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article reports results from an experiment studying how FINES, LENIENCY, and REWARDS for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without LENIENCY reduces cartel formation but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly FINES as punishments. LENIENCY improves antitrust by strengthening deterrence but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate the lower postconviction prices after reports/LENIENCY. With REWARDS, prices fall at the competitive level. Overall, our results suggest a strong cartel deterrence potential for well‐run LENIENCY and REWARD schemes. These findings may also be relevant for similar white‐collar organized crimes, such as corruption and fraud.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2012