Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/franchisee-associations-as-sources-of-bargaining-power-some-evidence-2SkSLiK004
References (62)
-
(2002)
Jury trials for franchisors -
(1989)
Franchise Relationship Laws: A Minefield for Franchisors, -
Paul Rubin (1978)
The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise ContractThe Journal of Law and Economics, 21
-
Benjamin Klein (1980)
Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual ArrangementsThe American Economic Review, 70
-
James Brickley (1999)
Incentive Conflicts and Contractual Restraints: Evidence from Franchising*The Journal of Law and Economics, 42
-
B. Klein, R. Crawford, A. Alchian (1978)
Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting ProcessThe Journal of Law and Economics, 21
-
R. Emerson (1998)
Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor DiscriminatesContracts & Commercial Law eJournal
-
Roberto Chinnici, Martin Gudgin, Jean Moreau, J. Schlimmer, S. Weerawarana (2004)
Web Services Description Language (WSDL) Version 2 -
Franchisee Associations: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself, Usually -
(1994)
Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations -A Return-of-Equity Approach -
J. Lerner, R. Merges (2003)
The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology IndustryJournal of Industrial Economics, 46
-
R. Blair, Francine Lafontaine (2005)
The Economics of Franchising: Concluding Remarks -
J. Hertog (2003)
Noncompetition Clauses: Unreasonable or Efficient?European Journal of Law and Economics, 15
-
Gillian Hadfield (1990)
Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete ContractsStanford Law Review, 42
-
S. Kaliski, R. Freeman, James Medoff (1986)
What Do Unions DoLabour/Le Travail, 18
-
Lafontaine Lafontaine, Shaw Shaw (2005)
Targeting Managerial Control: Evidence from FranchisingRand Journal of Economics, 36
-
Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein (2009)
Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise Termination -
O. Cochet (2007)
Preliminary evidence on the appointment of institutional solutions to franchisor moral hazard—the case of franchisee councilsManagerial and Decision Economics, 28
-
Steven Michael (2000)
Investments to create bargaining power: The case of franchisingStrategic Management Journal, 21
-
Kyle Mayer, Nicholas Argyres (2004)
Learning to Contract: Evidence from the Personal Computer IndustryOrgan. Sci., 15
-
Paul Rubin, Peter Shedd (1981)
Human Capital and Covenants Not to CompeteThe Journal of Legal Studies, 10
-
(2007)
Observations on Negotiating Franchise Agreement in Today's Legal Environment -
Mark Garmaise (2011)
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm InvestmentJournal of Law Economics & Organization, 27
-
Colin Camerer, D. Lovallo (1999)
Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental ApproachThe American Economic Review, 89
-
Inderst Inderst, Wey Wey (2003)
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic IndustriesRAND Journal of Economics, 34
-
Keeping your International Expansion Expectations Realistic -
Francine Lafontaine, M. Slade (2003)
Retail Contracting: Theory and PracticeJournal of Industrial Economics, 45
-
A. Kalnins, Francine Lafontaine (2004)
Multi-Unit Ownership in Franchising: Evidence from the Fast-Food Industry in TexasThe RAND Journal of Economics, 35
-
Lerner Lerner, Merges Merges (1998)
The Control of Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology IndustryJournal of Industrial Economics, 46
-
(2004)
Noncompetition Covenants: Protecting the Interests of Franchisees -
P. Joskow (1985)
Vertical integration and long term contracts : the case of coal burning electric generating plantsJournal of Law Economics & Organization, 1
-
Francine Lafontaine (1992)
Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical ResultsThe RAND Journal of Economics, 23
-
K. Crocker, S. Masten (1988)
Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and Contract LengthThe RAND Journal of Economics, 19
-
P. Joskow (1987)
Contract duration and relationship-specific investments: Empirical evidence from coal marketsThe American Economic Review, 77
-
S. Masten, K. Crocker (1985)
Efficient Adaptation in Long-term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural GasThe American Economic Review, 75
-
Benito Arruñada, Luis Garicano, Luis Vázquez (2001)
Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile DistributionNew Institutional Economics
-
James Brickley, Frederick Dark, M. Weisbach (1991)
An Agency Perspective on FranchisingFinancial Management, 20
-
Jonathan Klick, Bruce Kobayashi, Larry Ribstein (2012)
The Effect of Contract Regulation on FranchisingJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics-zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 168
-
Arruñada (2001)
Contractual Allocation of Decision Rights and Incentives: The Case of Automobile DistributionJournal of Law, Economics and Organization, 17
-
James Brickley, S. Misra, R. Horn (2006)
Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising*The Journal of Law and Economics, 49
-
James Brickley, Frederick Dark, M. Weisbach (1991)
The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination LawsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 34
-
Brian Malsberger (2004)
Covenants Not To Compete: A State-by-state Survey -
A. Dnes (1993)
A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise ContractsThe Journal of Legal Studies, 22
-
Uri Benoliel (2009)
The Expectation of Continuity Effect and Franchise Termination Laws: A Behavioral PerspectiveAmerican Business Law Journal, 46
-
R. Gilson (1998)
The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to CompeteEmployment
-
P. Aghion, J. Tirole (1994)
The Management of InnovationQuarterly Journal of Economics, 109
-
Camerer Camerer, Lovallo Lovallo (1999)
Overconfidence and Excess EntryAmerican Economic Review, 89
-
Emerson Emerson (1998)
Franchise Terminations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor DiscriminatesAmerican Business Law Journal, 35
-
S. Morris (1994)
TRADE WITH HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATIONEconometrica, 62
-
Dunham Dunham (2002)
Jury trials for franchisors: “…a delusion, a mockery and a snare”?Franchise Law Journal, 21
-
O. Williamson (1975)
Markets and Hierarchies -
James Combs, D. Ketchen (1999)
Can Capital Scarcity Help Agency Theory Explain Franchising? Revisiting the Capital Scarcity HypothesisAcademy of Management Journal, 42
-
S. Shane (1996)
Hybrid Organizational Arrangements and Their Implications for Firm Growth and Survival: A Study of New FranchisorsAcademy of Management Journal, 39
-
(2011)
The Economic Impact of Franchised Businesses: Volume III, Results for 2007. Prepared for the International Franchise Association Educational Foundation -
P. Rey (1991)
The Economics of Franchising -
H. Horn, A. Wolinsky (1988)
BILATERAL MONOPOLIES AND INCENTIVES FOR MERGERThe RAND Journal of Economics, 19
-
R. Inderst, Christian Wey (2001)
Bargaining, Mergers and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic IndustriesCEPR Discussion Paper Series
-
Paolo Leon (1986)
The Economic Institutions of CapitalismThe Antitrust Bulletin, 31
-
M. Eisenberg (1993)
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate LawFordham Law Review, 62
-
James Brickley, Frederick Dark (1987)
The choice of organizational form The case of franchisingJournal of Financial Economics, 18
-
Nicholas Argyres, J. Liebeskind (1999)
Contractual Commitments, Bargaining Power, and Governance Inseparability: Incorporating History Into Transaction Cost TheoryAcademy of Management Review, 24
-
S. Norton (1988)
An Empirical Look at Franchising as an Organizational FormThe Journal of Business, 61
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- ISSN
- 1058-6407
- eISSN
- 1530-9134
- DOI
- 10.1111/jems.12111
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The empirical literature in economics and strategy on contract structure, including on franchise contract structure, has been largely based on agency and transaction cost theories. The effects of bargaining power have been much less studied. This paper considers the role of independent franchisee associations in franchising relationships as a means to test for the presence of bargaining power effects. We find that the presence or absence of a franchisee association is significantly related to each of three key contractual and relationship characteristics: contract duration, noncompete stringency, and terminations/nonrenewals. This suggests that bargaining power should be accounted for in studies of contract structure and relationship outcomes.
Journal
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2015