Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Governance Characteristics and the Market Reaction to the SEC 's Proxy Access Rule

Governance Characteristics and the Market Reaction to the SEC 's Proxy Access Rule We examine the wealth effects of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent proxy access rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. We focus on how a firm's governance characteristics affect the market reaction to the rule. We find more negative announcement effects for firms with high probabilities of being targeted by shareholders. The announcement effects of the proxy access rule are positively related to the fraction of independent directors and the ratio of non‐cash‐based compensation, while announcement effects are inversely correlated with board size. Our findings suggest that the marginal shareholder does not perceive the proposed rule as value increasing. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png International Review of Finance Wiley

Governance Characteristics and the Market Reaction to the SEC 's Proxy Access Rule

International Review of Finance , Volume 12 (2) – Jun 1, 2012

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/governance-characteristics-and-the-market-reaction-to-the-sec-s-proxy-UkAJdCfxFZ

References (49)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
International Review of Finance © International Review of Finance Ltd. 2012
ISSN
1369-412X
eISSN
1468-2443
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-2443.2011.01134.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We examine the wealth effects of the Security and Exchange Commission's (SEC) recent proxy access rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. We focus on how a firm's governance characteristics affect the market reaction to the rule. We find more negative announcement effects for firms with high probabilities of being targeted by shareholders. The announcement effects of the proxy access rule are positively related to the fraction of independent directors and the ratio of non‐cash‐based compensation, while announcement effects are inversely correlated with board size. Our findings suggest that the marginal shareholder does not perceive the proposed rule as value increasing.

Journal

International Review of FinanceWiley

Published: Jun 1, 2012

There are no references for this article.