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Governors matter

Governors matter IntroductionGovernance institutions matter for development. Scholars have linked better governance to economic growth (Kaufmann and Kraay, ; Kaufmann et al., , ), foreign direct investment (Globerman and Shapiro, ), higher firms’ productivity and growth (Batra et al., ; Dollar et al., ), entrepreneurship (Hart, ) and regional development (Rodríguez‐Pose, ). Most researchers agree that ‘good’ governance institutions would have to provide for quality of public service provision, security of property rights, control of corruption and macroeconomic stability contributing to the business environment that reduces uncertainty and promotes productive investment activities. It is also increasingly clear that the particular institutional arrangements that work in one context do not in others (Jütting, ). Hence, specific governance institutions that could serve the aforementioned purposes could be different (Dixit, ; Rodrik, ). Moreover, alternative governance models exist not only at the state level. A significant heterogeneity in governance institutions that shape state–business relations has been found at the subnational level as well (Cali and Sen ; Pyle, ; Yakovlev, ). Motivated by this literature, this study seeks to identify the important subnational institutional arrangements that shape specific contexts (in our case in the context of the Russian Federation) and make for (or inhibit) a favourable business http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Economics of Transition and Institutional Change Wiley

Governors matter

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References (61)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ISSN
2577-6975
eISSN
2577-6983
DOI
10.1111/ecot.12124
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

IntroductionGovernance institutions matter for development. Scholars have linked better governance to economic growth (Kaufmann and Kraay, ; Kaufmann et al., , ), foreign direct investment (Globerman and Shapiro, ), higher firms’ productivity and growth (Batra et al., ; Dollar et al., ), entrepreneurship (Hart, ) and regional development (Rodríguez‐Pose, ). Most researchers agree that ‘good’ governance institutions would have to provide for quality of public service provision, security of property rights, control of corruption and macroeconomic stability contributing to the business environment that reduces uncertainty and promotes productive investment activities. It is also increasingly clear that the particular institutional arrangements that work in one context do not in others (Jütting, ). Hence, specific governance institutions that could serve the aforementioned purposes could be different (Dixit, ; Rodrik, ). Moreover, alternative governance models exist not only at the state level. A significant heterogeneity in governance institutions that shape state–business relations has been found at the subnational level as well (Cali and Sen ; Pyle, ; Yakovlev, ). Motivated by this literature, this study seeks to identify the important subnational institutional arrangements that shape specific contexts (in our case in the context of the Russian Federation) and make for (or inhibit) a favourable business

Journal

Economics of Transition and Institutional Change – Wiley

Published: Jul 1, 2017

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