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How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers

How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low‐quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low‐quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Rand Journal of Economics Wiley

How limiting deceptive practices harms consumers

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References (38)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2015 The RAND Corporation
ISSN
0741-6261
eISSN
1756-2171
DOI
10.1111/1756-2171.12099
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low‐quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low‐quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer welfare.

Journal

The Rand Journal of EconomicsWiley

Published: Sep 1, 2015

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