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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12025
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This article offers a new explanation for unscheduled price cuts and slow adoption of durable goods. We study a standard durable‐good monopoly model with a finite number of buyers and show that this game can have multiple subgame perfect equilibria in addition to the Pacman outcome—including the Coase conjecture. Of particular interest is a class of equilibria where the seller first charges a high price and only lowers that price once some—but not all—high‐valuation buyers purchase. This price structure creates a war of attrition between those buyers, which delays market clearing and rationalizes unscheduled purchase and price cut dates.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2013