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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2016 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12160
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Each of two experts may provide a service to a client. Experts' cost comparative advantage depends on an unknown state, but an expert may exert effort to get a private signal about it. In a market, an expert may refer the client to the other for a fee. In equilibrium, only one expert exerts effort and refers, and the equilibrium allocation is inefficient. Referral efficiency can be restored when experts form an organization, in which a referring expert must bear the referred expert's cost. However, the referred expert shirks from work effort because of the lack of cost responsibility.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Nov 1, 2016