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Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management

Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management This article examines how power‐sharing institutions might best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former adversaries following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. We identify four different forms of power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, we find that the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. We suggest that this relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power‐sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self‐enforcing peace. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png American Journal of Political Science Wiley

Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post‐Civil War Conflict Management

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Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0092-5853
eISSN
1540-5907
DOI
10.1111/1540-5907.00022
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This article examines how power‐sharing institutions might best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former adversaries following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. We identify four different forms of power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, we find that the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. We suggest that this relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power‐sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self‐enforcing peace.

Journal

American Journal of Political Science – Wiley

Published: Apr 1, 2003

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