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Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss CantonsUSC Finance & Business Economics Working Papers
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2013 © University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
- ISSN
- 1758-5880
- eISSN
- 1758-5899
- DOI
- 10.1111/1758-5899.12056
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
The Swiss economy's comparatively robust performance in the current economic crisis is partly the result of its characteristics, but public institutions also made Switzerland resilient. We focus here on institutions that foster sound public finances. The Swiss federal debt brake played a key role in keeping the federal debt in check; along with fiscal rules, institutions such as direct democracy and federalism counteract the biases that tend to make elected representatives less fiscally conservative than citizens. This leads to more well‐targeted public expenditure and greater public efficiency and helps to avoid excessively high taxes. These features are beneficial in ordinary times, and they increase the scope of action in times of crisis.
Journal
Global Policy – Wiley
Published: Jul 1, 2013