Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
O. Blanchard (1984)
Debt, Deficits, and Finite HorizonsJournal of Political Economy, 93
P. Burton (1993)
Intertemporal Preferences and Intergenerational Equity Considerations in Optimal Resource HarvestingJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24
P. Weil (1987)
Love thy children: Reflections on the Barro debt neutrality theoremJournal of Monetary Economics, 19
R. Howarth (1991)
Intertemporal equilibria and exhaustible resources: an overlapping generations approachEcological Economics, 4
J. Vidal (1997)
Conséquences macroéconomiques de l'altruisme intergénérationnel
G. Marini, P. Scaramozzino (1995)
Overlapping Generations and Environmental ControlJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 29
P. Michel, G. Rotillon (1995)
Disutility of pollution and endogenous growthEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 6
A. John, Rowena Pecchenino, D. Schimmelpfennig, Stacey Schreft (1995)
Short-lived agents and the long-lived environmentJournal of Public Economics, 58
Oded Galor, Harl Ryder (1989)
Existence, uniqueness, and stability of equilibrium in an overlapping-generations model with productive capitalJournal of Economic Theory, 49
A. John, Rowena Pecchenino (1994)
An Overlapping Generations Model of Growth and the EnvironmentThe Economic Journal, 104
L. Hultkrantz (1992)
Forestry and the bequest motiveJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 22
R. Barro (1974)
Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?Journal of Political Economy, 82
R. Solow (1986)
On the Intergenerational Allocation of Natural ResourcesThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 88
K. Löfgren (1991)
Another reconciliation between economists and forestry experts: OLG-argumentsEnvironmental and Resource Economics, 1
I. Musu (1994)
Sustainable economy and time preferenceStructural Change and Economic Dynamics, 5
We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady‐state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized. JEL classification: D62; D64; D91
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2000
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.