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Who Should Abate Carbon Emissions? An International ViewpointSustainability & Economics eJournal
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2005 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2005.00401.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
This paper explores the outcome of an international environmental agreement when the governments are elected by their citizens. It also considers a voter's incentives for supporting candidates who are less green than she is. In the extreme case of “global” pollution, the elected politicians pay no attention to the environment, and the resulting international agreement is totally ineffective. Moreover, if governments cannot negotiate and have to decide non‐cooperatively (and voters are aware of this), the elected politicians can be greener, ecological damage can be lower and the median voter's payoff can be higher than in the case with bargaining.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2005