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Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeco6The various cases we have just studied can be visualized by means of ®gures analogous to Figure A1
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- The Editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2000
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/1467-9442.00181
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In economics, politics and society, examples abound in economics, politics and society where agents can enter partial cooperation schemes, i.e., they can collude with a subset of agents. Several contributions devoted to specific settings have claimed that such partial cooperation actually worsens welfare compared to the no‐cooperation situation. Our paper assesses this view by highlighting the forces that lead to such results. We find that the nature of strategic spillovers is central to determining whether partial cooperation is bad. Our propositions are then applied to various examples as industry wage bargaining or local public goods. JEL classification: C72; E62; J5
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2000