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/lp/wiley/issue-linkage-versus-ringfencing-in-international-agreements-T3iQhe6TyZ
References (1)
-
A. Alesina, I. Angeloni, F. Etro (2005)
Economic unions, 95
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2023 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12521
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Issue linkage is often regarded as a means to enhance international cooperation in the presence of a sovereignty constraint. This constraint means a country can leave an agreement whenever it likes, if the perceived gains from leaving are larger than the gains from staying in the agreement. We set up a model of international agreements in which future gains from cooperation are uncertain, and it is bad realizations that can lead to exit. In this environment, we show that ringfencing dominates issue linkage, even in the absence of complementarities between separate issues, if the degree of uncertainty is sufficiently large.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Apr 1, 2023
Keywords: Exit; international agreements; issue linkage; ringfencing