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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2017 The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
- ISSN
- 0347-0520
- eISSN
- 1467-9442
- DOI
- 10.1111/sjoe.12202
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
I compare two types of employment contracts: those offering job protection and at‐will contracts. Their respective performances reveal the following trade‐off: at‐will contracts provide cheaper incentives for agents not to shirk, but they can induce the opportunistic actions of agents to make themselves less dispensable (“entrenchment”). One implication of the model is that more senior managers, such as chief executive officers, should receive more protection, for example, through contracts that are explicitly not at‐will or contracts that specify a longer duration.
Journal
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Oct 1, 2017
Keywords: ; ;