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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2016 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12156
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We study disclosure dynamics when the firm value evolves stochastically over time. The presence of litigation risk, arising from the failure to disclose unfavorable information, crowds out positive disclosures. Litigation risk mitigates firms' tendency to use inefficient disclosure policies. From a policy perspective, we show that a stricter legal environment may be an efficient way to stimulate information transmission in capital markets, particularly when the nature of information is proprietary. We model the endogeneity of litigation risk in a dynamic setting and shed light on the empirical controversy regarding whether disclosure preempts or triggers litigation.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Nov 1, 2016