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References (6)
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(2003)
Some Simple Economics of Open Source -
B. Miller, David Koski, Cjin Lee, Vivekandanda Maganty, R. Murthy, A. Natarajan, Jeff Steidl (1995)
Fuzz Revisited: A Re-examination of the Reliability of UNIX Utilities and Services
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2002 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
- ISSN
- 1058-6407
- eISSN
- 1530-9134
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00637.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
A simple model of open source software (as typified by the GNU‐Linux operating system) is presented. Individual user‐programmers decide whether to invest their own effort to develop a software enhancement that will become a public good if so developed. The effect of changing the population size of user‐programmers is considered; finite and asymptotic results are given. Welfare results are presented. It is shown that whether development will increase when applications have a modular structure depends on whether the developer base exceeds a critical size. Potential explanations of several stylized facts are given, including why certain useful programs don't get written.
Journal
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Wiley
Published: Dec 1, 2002