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OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS

OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Industrial Economics Wiley

OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS

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References (23)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2008 The Author. Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
ISSN
0022-1821
eISSN
1467-6451
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00339.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.

Journal

The Journal of Industrial EconomicsWiley

Published: Jun 1, 2008

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