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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 2007 RAND
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00074.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
A buyer procuring a single input possesses private information about each potential supplier's degree of fit with the buyer's needs. She can search among suppliers either sequentially or simultaneously. As long as the distribution of the fit parameter is not overly skewed to the left, sharing information with suppliers yields intensified price competition under simultaneous search. Moreover, the buyer cannot benefit by providing suppliers additional information beyond their own fitness parameter. Information revelation is never optimal with sequential search.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Jun 1, 2007