Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/optimal-job-design-in-the-presence-of-implicit-contracts-7SX0sdKnN0
References (29)
-
Dewatripont Dewatripont, Jewitt Jewitt, Tirole Tirole (2000)
Multitask Agency Problems: Focus and Task ClusteringEuropean Economic Review, 44
-
Shaw Shaw, Schneier Schneier (1995)
Team Measurement and Rewards: How Some Companies Are Getting It RightHuman Resource Planning, 18
-
Bartol Bartol, Hagmann Hagmann (1992)
Team‐Based Pay Plans: A Key to Effective TeamworkCompensation and Benefits Review, 24
-
Binsbergen Binsbergen, Brandt Brandt, Koijen Koijen (2008)
Optimal Decentralized Investment ManagementJournal of Finance, 63
-
Holmström Holmström, Milgrom Milgrom (1991)
Multi‐Task Principal‐Agent Problems: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership and Job DesignJournal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7
-
Coles Coles, Suay Suay, Woodbury Woodbury (2000)
Fund Advisor Compensation in Closed‐End FundsJournal of Finance, 55
-
Getmansky Getmansky, Lo Lo, Wei Wei (2004)
Sifting through the Wreckage: Lessons from Recent Hedge Fund LiquidationsJournal of Investment Management, 2
-
Bernheim Bernheim, Whinston Whinston (1990)
Multimarket Contact and Collusive BehaviorRAND Journal of Economics, 21
-
Inderst Inderst, Ottaviani Ottaviani (2009)
(Mis)selling through AgentsAmerican Economic Review, 99
-
Levin Levin (2003)
Relational Incentive ContractsAmerican Economic Review, 93
-
Bull Bull (1987)
The Existence of Self‐Enforcing Implicit ContractsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 102
-
Besanko Besanko, Regibeau Regibeau, Rockett Rockett (2005)
A Multi‐Task Principal‐Agent Approach to Organizational FormJournal of Industrial Economics, 53
-
Prather Prather, Middleton Middleton (2002)
Are N + 1 Heads Better Than One? The Case of Mutual Fund ManagersJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 47
-
Ramakrishnan Ramakrishnan, Thakor Thakor (1991)
Cooperation versus Competition in AgencyJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7
-
Fudenberg Fudenberg, Levine Levine, Maskin Maskin (1994)
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public InformationEconometrica, 62
-
Rayo Rayo (2007)
Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in TeamsReview of Economic Studies, 74
-
Corts Corts (2007)
Teams versus Individual Assignment: Solving Multi‐Task Problems through Job DesignRAND Journal of Economics, 38
-
Hoffman Hoffman, Rogelberg Rogelberg (1998)
A Guide to Team Incentive SystemsTeam Performance Management, 4
-
Bar‐Isaac Bar‐Isaac (2007)
Something to Prove: Reputation in TeamsRAND Journal of Economics, 38
-
Schöttner Schöttner (2008)
Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job DesignJournal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24
-
Che Che, Yoo Yoo (2001)
Optimal Incentives for TeamsAmerican Economic Review, 91
-
Itoh Itoh (1991)
Incentives to Help in Multiagent SituationsEconometrica, 59
-
Kvaløy Kvaløy, Olsen Olsen (2006)
Team Incentives in Relational Employment ContractsJournal of Labor Economics, 24
-
Chen Chen, Hong Hong, Huang Huang, Kubik Kubik (2004)
Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The Role of Liquidity and OrganizationAmerican Economic Review, 94
-
Gibbons Gibbons, Murphy Murphy (1992)
Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Political Economy, 100
-
Banker (1989)
Sensitivity, Precision and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance EvaluationJournal of Accounting Research, 27
-
Holmström Holmström (1982)
Moral Hazard in TeamsBell Journal of Economics, 13
-
Baker (1994)
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive ContractsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 109
-
Kvaløy Kvaløy (2002)
Multilateral Contracting and the Employment RelationshipQuarterly Journal of Economics, 117
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2011, RAND.
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00125.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the firms use implicit contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual assignment, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and (ii) team assignment, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. Team assignment mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cutoff rule where only the firms with high reputation concerns opt for team assignment. However, the cutoff rule need not hold if the firm can combine implicit incentives with explicit pay‐per‐performance contracts.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 2011