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Vertical Integration, Innovation and Foreclosure
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2016 The RAND Corporation
- ISSN
- 0741-6261
- eISSN
- 1756-2171
- DOI
- 10.1111/1756-2171.12158
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
With backward acquisitions in their efficient supplier, downstream firms profitably internalize the effects of their actions on their rivals' sales, while upstream competition is also relaxed. Downstream prices increase with passive, yet decrease with controlling acquisition. Passive acquisition is profitable when controlling acquisition is not. Downstream acquirers strategically abstain from vertical control, thus delegating commitment to the supplier, and with it high input prices, allowing them to charge high downstream prices. The effects of passive backward acquisition are reinforced with the acquisition by several downstream firms in the efficient supplier. The results are sustained when suppliers charge two‐part tariffs.
Journal
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Nov 1, 2016