Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Justus Baron, Henry Delcamp (2010)
Strategic Inputs into Patent PoolsERN: Formal & Informal (Implicit) Contractual Relations Between Firms (Topic)
Joseph Farrell, C. Shapiro (2008)
How Strong Are Weak PatentsThe American Economic Review, 98
Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 19, Number 2—Spring 2005—Pages 75–98 Probabilistic Patents
Joshi Joshi, Nerkar Nerkar (2011)
When Do Strategic Alliances Inhibit Innovation By Firms? Evidence from Patent Pools in the Global Optical Disc IndustryStrategic Management Journal, 32
Amol Joshi, Atul Nerkar (2011)
When do strategic alliances inhibit innovation by firms? Evidence from patent pools in the global optical disc industrySouthern Medical Journal, 32
Suzanne Scotchmer (1991)
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent LawJournal of Economic Perspectives, 5
(2005)
The Strategic Use of Patents: Implications for Antitrust" in Francois Leveque and Howard Shelanski, eds., Antitrust
Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser (2013)
Patent pools and innovation in substitute technologies—evidence from the 19th-century sewing machine industryThe RAND Journal of Economics, 44
Vianney Dequiedt, Bruno Versaevel (2007)
Patent Pools and the Dynamic Incentives to R&D
Choi Choi (2010)
Patent Pools and Cross Licensing in the Shadow of Patent LitigationInternational Economic Review, 51
Lemley Lemley, Shapiro Shapiro (2005)
Probabilistic PatentsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 19
J. Choi (2003)
Patent Pools and Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of Patent LitigationIntellectual Property Law eJournal
C. Shapiro (2001)
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements
N. Gallini (2011)
Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights : the Case of Patent Pools., 38
Reiko Aoki (2005)
Intellectual Property and Consortium Standard Patent Pools
Rudy Santore, M. McKee, D. Bjornstad (2010)
Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental EvidenceThe Journal of Law and Economics, 53
R. Gilbert (2004)
Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy EvolutionStanford Technology Law Review, 2004
(1998)
Patent Litigation as an Information Revelation Mechanism,”American
C. Shapiro (2010)
Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties1: September 2010American Law and Economics Review, 12
Gastón Llanes, S. Trento, Gastón Llanes, Antonio Cabrales, Antonio Ciccone, Marco Celentani, Andres Erosa, Belén Jerez, Gerard Llobet, Xavier Vives
Barcelona Economics Working Paper Series Patent Policy, Patent Pools, and the Accumulation of Claims in Sequential Innovation Patent Policy, Patent Pools, and the Accumulation of Claims in Sequential Innovation
Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser (2014)
Patent Pools, Competition, and Innovation - Evidence from 20 U.S. Industries under the New DealLaw & Society: Private Law eJournal
Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser (2009)
Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the 19th-Century Sewing Machine IndustryIRPN: Innovation Policy Studies (Topic)
R. Gilbert, M. Katz (2006)
Should good patents come in small packages? A welfare analysis of intellectual property bundlingInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 24
Young-Kwan Kwon, Yeonbae Kim, Tai-Yoo Kim, Yong-Il Song (2011)
Effects Of Patent Pools On Innovation Investment Ex Ante PerspectivesJournal of Business & Economics Research, 6
P. Rey, J. Tirole (2013)
Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essentiality Shapes Co-opetition ∗
C. Shapiro (2000)
Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard SettingInnovation Policy and the Economy, 1
Lampe Lampe, Moser Moser (2013)
Patent Pools and Innovation in Substitute Technologies—Evidence from the U.S. Sewing Machine IndustryRAND Journal of Economics, 44
Justus Baron, Henry Delcamp (2015)
The strategies of patent introduction into patent poolsEconomics of Innovation and New Technology, 24
Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser (2010)
Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from the Nineteenth-Century Sewing Machine IndustryThe Journal of Economic History, 70
J. Tirole, J. Lerner (2002)
Efficient Patent PoolsIO: Productivity
Ryan Lampe, Petra Moser (2012)
Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from 20 Industries in the 1930s
E. Beckner (2005)
STANDING ON THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS
Mark Schankerman, Suzanne Scotchmer (2001)
Damages and injunctions in protecting intellectual propertyThe RAND Journal of Economics, 32
(1995)
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guide Lines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property
Reiko Aoki, Sadao Nagaoka (2007)
Formation of a Pool with Essential Patents
This article analyzes patent pools and their effects on litigation incentives, overall royalty rates, and social welfare when patent rights are probabilistic and can be invalidated in court. With probabilistic patents, the license fees reflect the strength of the patents. We show that patent pools of complementary patents can be used to discourage infringement by depriving potential licensees of the ability to selectively challenge patents and making them committed to a proposition of all‐or‐nothing in patent litigation. If patents are sufficiently weak, patent pools with complementary patents reduce social welfare as they charge higher licensing fees and chill subsequent innovation incentives.
The Rand Journal of Economics – Wiley
Published: Sep 1, 2015
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.