Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation

Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation We develop a quality ladder model to study the R&D incentive impacts of intellectual property rights with a “research exemption” or “experimental use” provision. The innovation process is sequential and cumulative and takes place alongside production in an infinite‐horizon setting. We solve the model under two distinct intellectual property regimes, characterize the properties of the relevant Markov perfect equilibria, and investigate the profit and welfare effects of the research exemption. We find that firms, ex ante, always prefer full patent protection. The welfare ranking of the two intellectual property regimes, on the other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of the costs of initial innovation and improvements. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Wiley

Patents, Research Exemption, and the Incentive for Sequential Innovation

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/patents-research-exemption-and-the-incentive-for-sequential-innovation-0GvJcsSSkr

References (46)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2008, The Author(s) Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing
ISSN
1058-6407
eISSN
1530-9134
DOI
10.1111/j.1530-9134.2008.00182.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

We develop a quality ladder model to study the R&D incentive impacts of intellectual property rights with a “research exemption” or “experimental use” provision. The innovation process is sequential and cumulative and takes place alongside production in an infinite‐horizon setting. We solve the model under two distinct intellectual property regimes, characterize the properties of the relevant Markov perfect equilibria, and investigate the profit and welfare effects of the research exemption. We find that firms, ex ante, always prefer full patent protection. The welfare ranking of the two intellectual property regimes, on the other hand, depends on the relative magnitudes of the costs of initial innovation and improvements.

Journal

Journal of Economics & Management StrategyWiley

Published: Jun 1, 2008

There are no references for this article.